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Gambling is a longstanding and major entertainment industry 
in the United States,1 and the recent proliferation of sports betting 
and casino-style gambling websites has made it “more accessible 
than ever before.”2  There are an estimated 1800 Internet gambling 
operations currently in existence,3 most based outside the United 
States—generally in the Caribbean, Costa Rica or Great Britain, 
where they are legal and licensed.4  However, up to 70% of all bets 
 
 1 See Edward A. Taggert, Wide-Open City: Gambling, Prostitution Flourish in Tony 
Moran Era, at http://www.berkshistory.org/articles/moran.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2005) (“If drinking illegal alcoholic beverages was regarded as the No.1 vice during 
Prohibition, gambling was not far behind.  The Roarin’ Twenties popularized slot 
machines, pinball machines, the numbers game and other lotteries, and horse betting 
parlors.”); cf. Todd A. Lubben, The Federal Government and Regulation of Internet 
Sports Gambling, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 317, 317 (2003). 
 2 See Lubben, supra note 1. 
 3 Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 17, 
2004, at 2B. 
 4 Matt Richtel, Electronic Arts to Stop Advertising for Online Casinos on Its Website, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Richtel, Electronic Arts]; see also Matt 
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come from within the United States,5 where there is intense debate 
over the legality of Internet gambling under federal law.6 
Revenue from online gambling websites exceeded $6 billion in 
2003 and was projected to reach more than $7 billion in 2004.7  
Seeking to capitalize on this extremely lucrative market, numerous 
American corporations began accepting advertisements from 
offshore gambling websites in the late 1990s.8  However, the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) warned media trade 
groups in June 2003 that accepting advertisements from gambling 
websites might constitute “aiding and abetting” illegal operations.9  
Thereafter, the DOJ began taking action against some online 
gambling advertisers.10 
On August 9, 2004, Casino City, Inc. filed a complaint against 
the DOJ seeking a “declaratory judgment that advertising online 
casinos and sportsbooks is constitutionally protected commercial 
free speech under the First Amendment of the United States.”11  
Casino City is a Louisiana corporation that disseminates gambling 
information, news, strategies, and tips on its websites.12  Although 
“Casino City does not conduct or participate in online casino or 
 
Richtel, U.S. Steps Up Push Against Online Casinos by Seizing Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May 
31, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos]. 
 5 See Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, supra note 3. 
 6 See Gregory Manter, The Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet 
Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, July 11, 2003, ¶ 10. 
 7 Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, supra note 3; see also Matt Richtel, 
Companies Aiding Internet Gambling Feel U.S. Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 
A1. 
 8 Lawrence G. Walters, Advertising Online Casinos: An Analysis of the Legal Rights 
and Risks, 7 GAMING L. REV. 111, 111 (2003). 
 9 Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4; see also Casino City Files Suit 
Against U.S. Department of Justice to Establish its First Amendment Right to Advertise 
Online Casinos and Sportsbooks, at http://online.casinocity.com/FirstAmendment (Aug. 
9, 2004) [hereinafter Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview]. 
 10 See, e.g., Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4 (“United States 
marshals seized $3.2 million from Discovery Communications, the television and media 
company, in an aggressive effort to crack down on a new target, Internet gambling.”). 
 11 See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9; see also 
Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.  Notably, as of May 2004, 
“executives at media companies [had] not voiced public challenges to the government 
campaign.” Id. 
 12 Complaint at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-
M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
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sports book activities,”13 a portion of its revenues are derived from 
advertisements for “lawful overseas companies that offer online 
casino or sports book gambling.”14  The Justice Department filed a 
motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint on October 29, 2004.15 
Because the development of Internet gambling advertising law 
is still in its nascent stages, the outcome of Casino City’s action 
will have significant ramifications for media companies, the 
federal government, and Internet gambling operations alike.16  The 
Justice Department argues that current federal law prohibits 
Internet gambling17 and that advertising for this “illegal” activity 
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.18  However, 
some legal experts contend that American companies’ 
advertisements may be protected by the First Amendment 
regardless of the legality of online gambling in the United States,19 
and that the “‘aiding and abetting’ legal theory is . . . controversial 
and unprove[n].”20  Thus, at this point, “the legality of online 
gambling itself is still an open question as a result of conflicting 
court decisions and stalled legislation, [and] the legal issues 
relating to advertising online gambling services are even more 
obscure.”21 
This Note analyzes Casino City’s declaratory judgment action 
to determine whether the DOJ constitutionally may prohibit 
Internet gambling advertising, or whether these advertisements are 
First Amendment-protected commercial speech.  Part I.A 
introduces the federal gambling laws at issue in this case.  Part I.B 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s development of the commercial 
speech doctrine, focusing on the Court’s First Amendment 
treatment of advertisements for “vice” activities like gambling.  
 
 13 Id. at 3. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 16 Cf. Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 17 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19, Casino 
City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 20 See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4. 
 21 Walters, supra note 8, at 111. 
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Part II.A outlines the federal government’s argument that 
advertising for gambling websites constitutes “aiding and abetting” 
illegal activity, and Part II.B explains Casino City’s argument that 
these advertisements are First Amendment-protected commercial 
speech.  Finally, Part III concludes that the federal government 
may prohibit American corporations from advertising sports 
wagering websites because Internet sports betting is illegal under 
federal law.  However, the government may not restrict advertising 
for other forms of Internet gambling because these gambling 
activities are currently not illegal under any federal laws and do 
not satisfy the United States Supreme Court’s requirements for 
restricting lawful and nonmisleading commercial speech. 
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
Traditionally, the United States government has not taken a 
strong or active role in gambling regulation.22  In general, the 
federal government has left primary responsibility for setting and 
enforcing gambling policy to the individual states.23  Nevertheless, 
Congress has utilized its power under the Commerce Clause to 
enact federal gambling laws “where constitutional provisions, such 
as with Indian gambling, were relevant, where there was concern 
for the involvement of organized crime, or where the federal 
government might have to settle a dispute between states.”24  
Congress has also utilized its powers to restrict certain gambling 
activities and advertising based on the perceived well-being of the 
United States public.25  As a result, the law of Internet gambling 
advertising involves the intersection of proposed federal Internet 
gambling legislation, existing federal gambling and gambling 
 
 22 See James H. Frey, Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy: Federal 
Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 
139 (1998). 
 23 See Anthony N. Cabot and Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era, 
5 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002). 
 24 Frey, supra note 22, at 139, 141. 
 25 Cf. id. at 141. 
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advertising law, state gambling regulations, and First Amendment 
commercial speech.26 
A. The Federal Government’s Efforts to Prohibit Internet 
Gambling 
The federal government contends that Internet gambling is 
illegal under federal law, and that it can prosecute Internet 
gambling advertisers for “aiding and abetting” illegal activity.27  
Congress has been unable to promulgate any legislation that 
 
 26 The states’ treatment of Internet gambling is outside the scope of this Note.  In brief, 
state imposed Internet gambling laws differ from state to state.  The variation between 
state laws further complicates the legal analysis of Internet gambling.  Several states, 
including Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, have 
expressly outlawed Internet gambling. See Chuck Humphrey, State Gambling Law 
Summary, at http://www.gambling-law-us.com/State-Law-Summary (last visited Feb. 25, 
2005).  In addition, online gambling is illegal in states that prohibit all types of gambling, 
such as Utah. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE ISSUES 16 (Rep. No. GAO-03-89) (2002) [hereinafter GAO INTERNET GAMBLING 
REPORT], at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf.  New York courts have held that 
Internet gambling is illegal there under existing state law. See United States v. Cohen, 
260 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
401).  Both the New York Constitution and General Obligations Law prohibit all betting, 
other than certain exceptions for lotteries and horseracing. Id.  Not surprisingly, the 
gambling states Nevada and New Jersey have considered legalizing some forms of 
Internet gambling.  The State Legislature of New Jersey recently defeated a proposal that 
would have allowed Atlantic City casinos to go online. See M.A. Mehta, Critics Warn 
that N.J.’s New Online Wagering Could Leave Bettors . . . Going for Broke, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Nov. 19, 2004, at 51.  In July 1997, Nevada Governor Bob Miller 
signed a bill that created the misdemeanor of making or accepting a bet over the Internet 
from a player located in Nevada. See Nelson Rose, America Boldly Outlaws (and Quietly 
Legalizes) Internet Gambling, at http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/amountlaw.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005).  However, the bill carved out an exception that “making and 
accepting bets on the Internet [were] legal, if the wagers were accepted in Nevada by 
Nevada-licensed race and sports books and casinos.” See id.  In 2001, Nevada lawmakers 
voted “to give the Nevada Gaming Commission . . . the authority to develop rules for 
casino operators to launch and maintain online gambling establishments within the state,” 
and to promulgate guidelines for such establishments that adhered to state and federal 
gambling regulations. See Craig Lang, Note & Comment, Internet Gambling: Nevada 
Logs In, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 525, 535–36 (2002).  However, Nevada has not 
moved forward with its Internet gambling plans due to opposition by the federal 
government. Id. at 526–27. 
 27 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, Casino 
City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 
2004). 
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explicitly outlaws Internet gambling.28  However, existing federal 
laws proscribe a wide range of gambling activities that reasonably 
could be interpreted to include Internet gambling,29 and there are 
federal statutes that curtail the advertising of certain gambling 
activities.30  At the same time, other federal laws sanction some 
forms of gambling, such as state-run lotteries, and casino gambling 
for Native American tribes.31  These favored gambling activities 
are exempt from most of the federal gambling advertising 
restrictions.32 
1. The DOJ’s Campaign against Internet Gambling 
Advertisers 
The federal government began its campaign to prohibit 
American corporations from advertising online gambling websites 
in June 2003, when the DOJ sent letters to trade groups 
representing major broadcasters and publishers, i.e., the National 
Association of Broadcasters, the Magazine Publishers of America, 
the Independent Press Association, and the National Newspaper 
Association.33  The trade groups were advised to warn their 
members that they “could be violating [federal] law by displaying 
advertisements on behalf of offshore casinos,”34 that they “could 
be seen as ‘aiding and abetting’ the activities of the [online] 
casinos,”35 and that “individuals accepting such advertisements 
might face prosecution.”36 
Thereafter, the United States Attorney’s office in St. Louis 
convened a grand jury to investigate American companies doing 
business with offshore casinos.37  As part of this investigation, the 
 
 28 See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 3; see also discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 29 Cf. Walters, supra note 8, at 115; see also discussion infra Part I.A.3. 
 30 See discussion infra Part I.A.4. 
 31 See Walters, supra note 8, at 114; Frey, supra note 22, at 147–48. 
 32 See Walters, supra note 8, at 114; see also infra notes 120, 122–125 and 
accompanying text. 
 33 See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 34 Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 37 See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4; Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, 
supra note 4. 
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Justice Department sent subpoenas to a variety of media outlets, 
Internet portals, public relations firms, and other companies, 
seeking information about their connections to “offshore casinos” 
as well as the purchase and placement of online sportsbook and 
casino advertisements.38 
Then, in April 2004, the DOJ sent U.S. marshals to seize $3.2 
million in advertising proceeds from Discovery Communications.39  
The money had been paid to Discovery Networks in October 2003 
by Tropical Paradise, an online casino company based in Costa 
Rica, for television spots to advertise an online poker room during 
the Travel Channel’s broadcast of the “World Poker Tour.”40  
“According to court documents, the government seized the money 
and told Discovery . . . that it could be party to an illegal activity 
by broadcasting the advertisements.”41  Following this seizure, 
Discovery Networks stopped accepting advertisements for online 
casinos and sportsbooks.42 
To avoid prosecution by the DOJ, other major broadcasters, 
including Infinity Broadcasting and Clear Channel 
Communications, stopped accepting online gambling 
advertisements in the fall of 2003.43  Popular Internet portals 
Google and Yahoo followed suit in April 2004.44  Yahoo 
acknowledged that “‘a lack of clarity in the environment’ made 
gambling advertising ‘too risky.’”45  In June 2004, the video game 
giant Electronic Arts decided to stop running Internet casino 
advertisements on its website as well.46 
The Justice Department’s actions have rippled beyond the 
realm of advertising.  Many American financial institutions have 
taken independent steps to prohibit transactions between gamblers 
 
 38 See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9; Richtel, U.S. 
Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 39 See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id.; Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 44 See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 45 Jacob Sullum, Abetting Betting: Is Talking About Online Gambling Illegal?, at 
http://reason.com/sullum/040904.shtml (Apr. 9, 2004). 
 46 See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4. 
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and Internet gambling websites due to the uncertain legal climate 
and their assessment of online gambling as a high risk industry.47  
For example, both American Express and Discover credit cards 
cannot be used for Internet gambling.48  Furthermore, although 
MasterCard and Visa do not uniformly restrict the use of their 
credit cards for Internet gambling, they have developed procedures 
that allow “member banks” to block certain transactions.49  Some 
of America’s largest banks, including Citibank, Bank of America, 
and Wells Fargo, prohibit their credit cards from being used for 
online gambling transactions.50  The same is true for dominant 
credit card issuers such as MBNA, Capital One, and Providian 
Financial.51  Even the London-based Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (“HSBC”) now bars these transactions.52  
Gamblers have also encountered obstacles when adding money to 
their gambling accounts through digital money services.53  
Numerous electronic money services, including PayPal, have 
abandoned this “extremely lucrative market.”54 
As a result of the DOJ’s actions, Casino City alleges that it lost 
several important advertising deals that would have formed an 
important part of the gambling news source’s revenue.55  Before 
the DOJ’s crackdown, Casino City’s parent corporation had plans 
with A&E Television Networks to promote a “Breaking Vegas” 
documentary and an associated sweepstakes in which Casino City 
 
 47 See generally GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26. 
 48 See id. at 24. 
 49 See id. at 21. 
 50 See Nelson Rose, Why Visa Is Dropping Online Gambling, 7 GAMING L. REV. 243, 
243 (2003).  In the case of Citibank, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer heavily 
influenced this decision. See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 8 (“Spitzer accused the credit card 
company of knowingly profiting from an illegal activity.  This allegation, if prosecuted, 
could have resulted in criminal liability under New York law.  Citibank denied any 
wrongdoing but agreed to contribute $400,000 to compulsive gambler counseling 
services.”). 
 51 Rose, supra note 50, at 243. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id.  Eliot Spitzer pursued PayPal after his successful confrontation with Citibank. 
See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 9.  Although PayPal declared that it had already agreed to 
prohibit gambling transactions as part of its acquisition by eBay, PayPal settled with the 
State of New York for $200,000 in disgorged profits. Id. 
 54 Rose, supra note 50, at 243. 
 55 See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
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was to be featured on the History Channel website and in thirty 
national television commercials.56  A&E began promotion for the 
company, but then cancelled the partnership agreement.57  A&E 
felt there was an “unacceptable risk” that it would be viewed as 
aiding and abetting online gambling, since Casino City’s home 
page provided links to online gambling websites.58  In addition, 
Casino City CEO Mr. Corfman proffered that a major Las Vegas 
casino had wanted to work with Casino City’s parent corporation 
on a separate promotion, but that its lawyers had called off the 
arrangement because of Casino City’s involvement with online 
gambling.59  The Justice Department considers its actions to be 
justified because it believes that Internet gambling is illegal under 
federal law, and there is no First Amendment right to advertise 
illegal activity.60 
2. Federal Efforts to Enact Anti-Internet Gambling 
Legislation 
The DOJ’s claim that there is no First Amendment right to 
advertise illegal activity rests on the premise that Internet gambling 
is illegal under existing, non-Internet specific, federal law.61  
Congress has been unsuccessful thus far in its attempts to pass 
legislation that specifically outlaws Internet gambling.62  It first 
sought to prohibit Internet gambling as early as 1995, which was 
when the first casino appeared on the Internet.63  “As part of his 
1995 Crime Prevention Act, Senator John Kyl [(R-Arizona)] 
introduced a provision that would make it illegal for an individual 
to participate in Internet gambling if gambling was illegal in that 
person’s state;”64 however, the bill was defeated in committee.65 
 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17, 
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed 
Aug. 9, 2004). 
 61 See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Lang, supra note 26, at 535–36 
 63 See id. at 535. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. 
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The following year, Congress created the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission to study the “social and economic 
impacts” of gambling—including online betting—on the American 
public.66  The Commission issued its final report in 1999, which 
recommended: “(1) that the federal government prohibit any 
Internet gambling not already authorized and encourage foreign 
governments not to harbor Internet gambling organizations, and (2) 
that Congress pass legislation prohibiting the collection of credit 
card debt for Internet gambling.”67  The Commission raised social 
and economic concerns about online gambling including 
“underage gambling, pathological gambling, lack of consumer 
protections, and money laundering.”68  In response to these issues, 
Congress asked the United States General Accounting Office 
(“GAO”) to study the relationship between United States payment 
systems, particularly credit cards, and Internet gambling.69 
Another result of the Commission’s report was the numerous 
bills to prohibit online gambling that were introduced in 
Congress.70  In 2000, the Senate unanimously passed a bill that 
created a new statute to prohibit Internet gambling.71  This bill 
failed, however, to receive the two-thirds support it needed to pass 
in the House.72  In 2002, the House of Representatives passed its 
own Internet gambling bill after a series of unsuccessful attempts.73  
The Internet Gambling Enforcement Act74 (or “Leach Act”) was 
introduced by Representatives Jim Leach (R-Iowa) and John 
DeFalce (D-NY), in an attempt to “limit U.S. access to Internet 
gambling sites hosted on offshore servers . . . by prohibiting 
Internet gambling businesses from accepting credit, electronic 
funds transfers, checks or drafts from would-be American Internet 
gamblers.”75  The bill also “implicate[d] financial institutions that 
 
 66 See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 1. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 2. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 7–8. 
 71 See Lang, supra note 26, at 535.  The bill was called the “Internet Gambling 
Prohibition Act.” Id. 
 72 See id. at 535–36. 
 73 See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
 74 H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 75 Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
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may [have] knowingly act[ed] as intermediate agents between 
gamblers and the Internet gaming business.”76  The Leach Act, 
however, died in the Senate without being put to a vote,77 and 
subsequent efforts by Congress to pass Internet gambling 
legislation have met no better fate.78 
3. Existing Federal Anti-Gambling Statutes 
Despite Congress’ failure to pass anti-Internet gambling 
legislation, the DOJ maintains that Internet gambling is already 
illegal under existing federal laws.79  In its motion to dismiss the 
complaint of Casino City, the DOJ argued that Internet gambling is 
illegal under the Wire Act,80 the Travel Act,81 and the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act.82  Therefore, the DOJ can prosecute those 
 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. at ¶ 7. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19, 
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed 
Aug. 9, 2004). 
 80 Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000)). 
 81 Pub. L. No. 87-228, § 1(a), 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 
(2000 & Supp. 2002)). 
 82 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 84 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 
(2000)).  The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”) also 
supports the DOJ’s contention that online sports betting is illegal under federal law. Pub. 
L. No. 102-559, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 4227 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 
(2000)).  PASPA makes it unlawful for any State, Indian tribe, or person “to sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” any lottery or 
gambling scheme “based directly or indirectly . . . on . . . competitive games in which 
amateur or professional athletes participate.” Id. § 3702.  PASPA has two major 
exemptions. Id. § 3704(a).  Subsection (a) has a total of four exceptions, however. See id. 
§ 3704(a).  First, lawful sports gambling schemes that were in operation when the bill 
was introduced were allowed to continue. Id. § 3704(a).  This exemption preserved the 
licensed sports pools that existed in Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana when the 
statute was promulgated, but “barred additional states from sponsoring sports-based 
lotteries or betting pools on college [or] professional sports.” Frey, supra note 22, at 146; 
see also Jeffrey Rodefer, Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/sports-protection.htm (last visited Feb. 
25, 2005).  Second, PASPA also exempts gambling on jai-alai and pari-mutuel horse and 
dog racing. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(4).  Notably, however, the DOJ has not cited PASPA in 
support of its advertising restrictions or the contention that Internet gambling is illegal 
under federal law.  See Rodefer, supra; see, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).  The DOJ strongly 
opposed the passage of PASPA since it believed the statute constituted a substantial 
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who advertise this “illegal” gambling activity under the “aiding 
and abetting” statute.83 
a) The Wire Act 
The Wire Act was enacted by Congress in 1961 “as part of a 
series of antiracketeering laws.”84  The goal of the Wire Act is to 
assist the States “in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to 
gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to aid in the 
suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use 
of . . . wire communication facilities which are or will be used for 
the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and 
foreign commerce.”85  Specifically, the Wire Act makes illegal the 
use of a “wire communication facility” for the transmission of bets 
or wagers on any “sporting event or contest” in interstate or 
foreign commerce.86  In general, two elements must be present for 
a violation of the Wire Act: (1) the information transmitted by wire 
 
intrusion on states’ rights. See Rodefer, supra (citing 1992 U.S. CODE & CONG. NEWS 
3563).  To date, the only reported case to interpret PASPA is Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999), in which the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the statute’s exemptions made the scope of its advertising prohibition 
“somewhat unclear.” Id. at 180; see also Rodefer, supra.  Because the DOJ has been 
unwilling to utilize PASPA in any context, the statute will not be considered in this Note. 
 83 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 84 Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Wire Wager Act, http://www.gambling-law-
us.com/Federal-Laws/wire-act.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
 85 David B. McGinty, The Near-Regulation of Online Sports Wagering by United 
States v. Cohen, 7 GAMING L. REV. 205, 209 (2003) (citing Letter from Robert F. 
Kennedy, United States Attorney General, to Speaker of the House of Representatives 
(Apr. 6, 1961) (found in H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633); Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1968)).  
The Justice Department has traditionally utilized the Wire Act to prosecute bookies who 
accepted and completed bets over the telephone from people in jurisdictions where 
gambling is illegal. See id. 
 86 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000).  The full text of subsection (a) of the Wire Act provides: 
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses 
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign 
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire 
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a 
result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers, shall be fined under this titled or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both. 
Id. 
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must have assisted in the placing of bets or wagers, and (2) the 
defendant must have been engaged in the business of wagering or 
betting during the time of transmission.87 
The Wire Act has several limitations, however.  First, the 
statute was specifically enacted to prohibit sports betting, and is 
ambiguous on other gambling activities.88  Second, the statute does 
not apply to any pari-mutuel betting, such as horse or dog racing, 
that is lawful under many states’ laws.89  Third, subsection (b) of 
the Wire Act contains a safe harbor clause.90  The first safe harbor 
exempts the transmission of information “for use in news reporting 
 
 87 See Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 88 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). 
 89 See United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1971).  Pari-mutuel 
wagering is a system of wagering in which bettors bet against one another instead of 
against the house.  For pari-mutuel wagering, the money bet on a race is pooled, and 
approximately 80 percent is returned to the winning bettor.  The remaining 20 percent 
(the takeout) is distributed among the state government, the jockeys that race at the track, 
and the racetrack owners.  The amount allotted for the takeout varies among states. See 
Para-Mutuel Betting, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/p1/parimutu.asp (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2005); GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 15 n.30.  
Horseracing provides a unique departure from other federal gambling laws.  In 1978, 
Congress passed the Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”) to regulate and promote 
interstate commerce with regard to pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. Pub. L. No. 95-
515, § 2, 92 Stat. 1811 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3001–07 (2000)).  Under the 
authority of the IHA, numerous states developed systems of pari-mutuel wagering on 
state-licensed horse races over the Internet. See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 15.  However, “[i]n March 2000, DOJ officials testified [before the 
House Subcommittee on Crime] that it was a violation of the Wire Act . . . to offer bets 
on horserace[ing] over the Internet.” Id. at 16.  Because the Wire Act is a criminal statute, 
the DOJ insisted that IHA, which is a civil statute, could not override it. Id. at 43.  IHA, 
however, was amended in December 2000 “to explicitly expand interstate off-track 
wagers to include wagers through the telephone or other electronic media.” Id. at 16.  
Currently, no suits have been brought by the DOJ against the aforementioned “state-
licensed horse racing tracks.” Id. at 16.  Nevertheless, given the DOJ’s testimony that the 
Wire Act trumps IHA, the DOJ’s current position on the legality of interstate Internet 
wagering on state-licensed horseracing is unclear.  However, the IHA and associated 
issues are outside the scope of this Note. 
 90 The full text of subsection (b) of the Wire Act provides: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in 
interstate or foreign commerce of  information for use in news reporting of 
sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in 
the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or 
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a 
State or foreign country in which such betting  is legal. 
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b). 
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of sporting events or contests.”91  The second safe harbor permits 
the transmission of information relating to betting on particular 
sports where such betting was legal in both the state from which 
the information was sent and the state in which it was received.92  
In addition, for the second safe harbor to apply, the information 
comprising the transmission must “merely assist” in the placing of 
the bets.93  Despite these exceptions, the DOJ can utilize the Wire 
Act to harness many types of illegal gambling operations, 
especially sports gambling, since the text of the statute specifically 
prohibits the transmission of bets or wagers on any “sporting event 
or contest.”94 
b) The Travel Act 
The Travel Act was enacted in 196195 to provide federal 
assistance in situations in which local law enforcement was 
ineffective in attacking criminal activities that extended beyond the 
borders of its state.96  The Travel Act is aimed at prohibiting 
interstate travel “with the intent to engage in certain unlawful 
behaviors,” including the business of gambling.97  Thus, the Travel 
Act makes it a crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce 
with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity, 
commit any violent crime to further any unlawful activity, or 
otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate any 
unlawful activity.98 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.; see also Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. v. Burrillville Racing Ass’n, 989 F.2d 
1266, 1272–73 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 93 See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13. 
 94 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
 95 Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Travel Act Scope and Predicates, http://www.gambling-
law-us.com/Federal-Laws/travel-act.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (citation omitted). 
 96 United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 97 Frey, supra note 22, at 142. 
 98 The Travel Act provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any 
facility in interstate or foreign  commerce with intent to— 
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or 
(2) commit any crime in violence to further any unlawful activity; or 
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the 
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful 
activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform— 
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“The Travel Act ‘refers to state law only to identify [a] 
defendant’s unlawful activity.’”99  Therefore, a conviction under 
the Travel Act necessitates a violation of either a state or local 
law.100  Under the Travel Act, the term “unlawful activity” 
includes any business enterprise involving illegal gambling.101  
Courts have held that the use of “the mail, telephone or telegraph, 
newspapers, credit cards and tickertapes is sufficient to establish 
that a defendant ‘used a facility of interstate commerce’ to further 
an unlawful activity in violation of the Travel Act.”102 
c) The Illegal Gambling Business Act 
Congress promulgated the Illegal Gambling Business Act as 
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.103  This Act 
targets syndicated gambling on the theory that large-scale illegal 
gambling operations finance organized crime, which, in turn, has a 
significant impact on interstate commerce.104  It is a crime under 
the Illegal Gambling Business Act to operate an illegal gambling 
business, which is defined as a gambling operation that (1) is in 
violation of state or local law where it is conducted, (2) involves 
five or more persons that conduct, finance, manage, supervise, 
direct, or own all or part of the business, and (3) remains in 
substantially continuous operation for more than thirty days or has 
a gross revenue of $2000 on any given day.105  Like the Travel 
 
(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or 
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results 
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or life. 
(b) As used in this section, (i) ‘unlawful activity’ means (1) any business 
enterprise involving gambling . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 99 Rodefer, supra note 95 (citing United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434 (7th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 100 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b). 
 101 See id. § 1952(b)(i)(1). 
 102 Rodefer, supra note 95 (citations omitted). 
 103 Jeffrey Rodefer, Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970, http://www.gambling-law-
us.com/Federal-Laws/illegal-gambling.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005). 
 104 See United States v. Lee, 173 F.3d 809, 810–11 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 105 See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 14.  The Illegal Gambling 
Business Act provides, in pertinent part: 
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Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act requires a predicate 
violation of state or local law.106  In addition, the statute includes 
all individuals who participate in an online gambling business, 
however minor their role,107 but does not target bettors for 
prosecution.108  This reflects Congress’ intent for the statute to 
target syndicated gambling operations, which are normally run by 
organized crime, as opposed to individuals. 
d) The “Aiding and Abetting” Statute 
Finally, the “aiding and abetting” statute provides that anyone 
who “commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal.”109  This statute requires a showing that 
the defendant “willfully” associates himself with a criminal 
enterprise.110  Because the DOJ contends that Internet gambling is 
an “offense against the United States,” it reasons that media 
companies that willfully advertise for these online gambling 
 
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or 
part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both. 
(b) As used in this section— 
(1) ‘illegal gambling business’ means a gambling business which— 
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which 
it is conducted; 
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, 
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and 
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a 
period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any 
single day. 
(2) ‘gambling’ includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, 
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting 
lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein. 
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000). 
 106 Rodefer, supra note 103. 
 107 United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Minn. 1973), aff’d, 508 F.2d 
1200 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 108 See id. at 250. 
 109 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000).  Further, Subsection (b) provides: “Whoever willfully 
causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an 
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principle.” Id. § 2(b). 
 110 Lawrence G. Walters, The Law of Online Gambling in the United States—A Safe Bet, 
or Risky Business?, 7 GAMING L. REV. 445, 446 (2003). 
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websites are “aiding and abetting” criminal activity and may be 
punished just as the offshore website operators could be punished 
if they were within the jurisdiction of the United States courts.111 
4. Existing Federal Gambling Advertising Statutes 
In addition to the laws that criminalize illegal gambling 
operations, Congress has also enacted federal laws that restrict 
gambling advertising.112  The reach of these statutes has been 
reduced over the past twenty years, both by Congress in its desire 
to encourage certain forms of gambling, and by the Supreme Court 
in its development of modern First Amendment commercial speech 
jurisprudence.113  Nevertheless, these statutes are relevant to the 
Internet gambling advertising debate; particularly to the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of gambling advertising under the First 
Amendment. 
a) The Communications Act of 1934 
The Communications Act of 1934114 prohibits the radio or 
television broadcast of any advertisement of any “lottery, gift 
enterprise, or similar scheme” that offers prizes dependent upon lot 
or chance.115  Courts have interpreted the Communications Act to 
prohibit the advertising of private casino gambling as well as 
information concerning lotteries.116  When Congress passed the 
Communications Act in 1934, the federal government had a 
 
 111 See id. 
 112 See Walters, supra note 8, at 111–12. 
 113 See discussion infra Part I.C.1–3. 
 114 48 Stat. 1088 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000)). 
 115 See id.  The full text of § 1304 reads: 
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a 
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any 
such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any  advertisement of or 
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering 
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes 
drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, 
whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
Id. 
 116 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177 
(1999); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 290–91 (1954). 
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uniform policy of discouraging gambling.117  However, “federal 
statutes now accommodate both pro-gambling and antigambling 
segments of the national polity.”118 
The federal government’s changing perception of gambling is 
reflected in the fact that Congress has significantly narrowed the 
scope of the Communications Act since 1934.119  In 1975, 
Congress amended the Act to allow advertisements for state-
conducted lotteries when “broadcast by a radio or television station 
licensed to a location in . . . a State which conducts such a 
lottery.”120  In 1988, Congress enacted two other statutes that 
further curbed the Communications Act’s coverage.121  First, the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act authorized Native American tribes 
to conduct various forms of gambling on Indian reservations in any 
state that allowed gambling for any purpose,122 and exempted any 
gambling conducted pursuant to it from the broadcast restrictions 
of the Communications Act.123  Second, the Charity Games 
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988 (“CGACA”)124 extended the 
Communications Act’s exemptions for state-run lotteries to include 
any other lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme if it was not 
prohibited by the State in which it operated and was conducted by 
any governmental organization, not-for-profit organization, or 
commercial organization as a promotional activity “clearly 
occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that 
organization.”125  Hence, CGACA allows casinos run by state and 
local governments to broadcast gambling advertisements without 
penalty.126 
 
 117 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177–78. 
 118 Id. at 180. 
 119 See id. at 178. 
 120 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 121 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 178. 
 122 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000). 
 123 25 U.S.C. § 2720 (2000). 
 124 Pub. L. No. 100-625, 102 Stat. 3205 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 
(2000)). 
 125 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2). 
 126 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 179.  Not-for-profit fishing contests are also 
exempted from the Communications Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000). 
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However, these curtailments of the Communications Act 
rendered it a discriminatory statute that favored state-run and 
Indian-run casino gambling at the expense of private operators.  
The DOJ and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
acknowledged as much in a 1999 brief to the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which stated that the FCC would no longer enforce the 
Communications Act broadcasting ban, even in states where casino 
gambling was illegal.127  Thus, the federal government recognized 
that the Communications Act could no longer withstand First 
Amendment challenges in the context of land-based casino 
advertising.128  The government, however, has made no such 
promise with regard to applying the Communications Act to 
Internet gambling advertising, and the First Amendment debate 
would be very different in this context because the federal 
government’s treatment of online gambling has not been 
contradictory or discriminatory.129 
b) The Direct Mail Statute 
The Direct Mail statute is implicated whenever a gambling 
advertisement is sent through the mails.130  This statute prohibits 
the “advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any 
kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or 
chance,”131 and empowers the postal service to prevent its violation 
by issuing “stop mail” orders.132  The Direct Mail statute has been 
interpreted to prohibit the mailing of newspapers containing lottery 
advertisements.133  This carries added significance because both 
the Post Office and the FCC interpret the term “lotteries” broadly 
to include virtually all forms of gambling, including casino 
 
 127 See Kathleen E. Burke, Comment, Greater New Orleans Broadcast Association v. 
United States: Broadcasters Have Lady Luck, or at Least the First Amendment, on Their 
Side, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 500 (2001). 
 128 See id. 
 129 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 130 See 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000); see also Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 131 18 U.S.C. § 1302. 
 132 See Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 133 See Minn. Newspaper Ass’n v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 677 F. Supp. 1400, 
1406 (D. Minn. 1987), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 225 (1989). 
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gambling.134  Therefore, the Direct Mail statute prohibits most, if 
not all, print gambling advertisements. 
The DOJ can attempt to utilize the Communications Act and 
the Direct Mail statute to restrict online gambling advertisements 
via the mediums of radio, television, or mail.  The question 
remains, however, whether enforcing these statutes against Casino 
City and other similarly situated advertisers of Internet gambling 
services violates the First Amendment. 
B. The First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids 
Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press.”135  Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the First Amendment to afford less protection to commercial 
speech than political or religious speech.136  Such disparate 
treatment has been justified on the basis that commercial speech 
“is not essential to the maintenance of a legitimate, viable 
democracy and an informed, active public.”137  A further 
justification has been that commercial speech “is purportedly 
capable of objective truth, whereas political speech is ripe with 
alterative, subjective views.  Thus, regulation of commercial 
speech does not prohibit the exchange of different views or 
endorse one view as truth over another as would regulation of 
political speech”138  The Supreme Court used to be particularly 
unprotective of commercial speech when it sought to advertise for 
“vice” activities, such as gambling, alcohol, and cigarettes.139  
Over the past thirty years, however, the Supreme Court has 
rejected these exceptions for vice activities and bestowed an 
increasing amount of First Amendment protection upon all 
commercial speech.140 
 
 134 See Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 135 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 136 Dana M. Shelton, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States: 
The Fifth Circuit Upholds the Federal Ban on Casino Gambling Advertising against a 
First Amendment Challenge, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (1996). 
 137 Id. at 1726. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 140 See discussion infra Part I.C.3. 
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1. History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Until the 1970s, commercial speech was considered to be 
entirely outside the realm of First Amendment protection.141  
Indeed, in the 1942 case Valentine v. Chrestensen,142 the Supreme 
Court set forth the early commercial speech doctrine that while 
government may not “unduly burden or proscribe” the freedom of 
communication of information or opinion, “the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”143  However, in the landmark 1975 case 
Bigelow v. Virginia,144 the Supreme Court rejected this 
longstanding principle and developed a doctrine that entitled non-
misleading commercial messages to a degree of First Amendment 
protection.145 
In Bigelow, a Virginia newspaper editor was convicted of 
violating a Virginia statute after his newspaper published an 
advertisement that described the legality and availability of 
abortions in New York.146  The Supreme Court overturned the 
editor’s conviction, holding that the statute, as applied, 
unconstitutionally infringed his First Amendment rights.147  It 
announced that even “commercial advertising enjoys a degree of 
First Amendment protection,”148 and that it was error to assume 
that commercial speech was “valueless in the marketplace of 
ideas.”149  The Court emphasized that the advertised activity 
contained a factual message of clear “public interest” to a diverse 
audience150 and “pertained to constitutional interests.”151  In 
addition, the Court found it significant that the services advertised 
in the Virginia newspaper were legal in New York at the time,152 
 
 141 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 142 316 U.S. 52. 
 143 Id. at 54. 
 144 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 145 Id. at 818. 
 146 Id. at 811. 
 147 Id. at 829. 
 148 Id. at 821. 
 149 Id. at 826. 
 150 Id. at 822. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 822–23. 
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reasoning that the Virginia Legislature could not curtail the 
dissemination of information about services that were legal in 
another state over which Virginia had no regulatory authority.153   
The following term, in the 1976 case Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,154 the Supreme 
Court expanded on Bigelow and held that speech that does “no 
more than propose a commercial transaction,” such as an 
advertisement that lacked any political or social message, was 
entitled to First Amendment protection.155  As such, a blanket ban 
on advertising the price of prescription drugs in Virginia violated 
the First Amendment.156  The Court rejected the state’s “highly 
paternalistic approach,” reasoning “that people will perceive their 
own best interests if only they are well enough informed.”157   
Four years later, the Supreme Court assessed its commercial 
speech jurisprudence and set forth a framework to determine 
whether regulations that suppressed commercial speech were 
permissible under the First Amendment.158  In the 1980 case 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,159 the Supreme Court crafted the 
following four-part test for evaluating commercial speech 
restrictions: 
[1] At the outset, we must determine whether the 
expression is protected by the First Amendment.  For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  [2] 
 
 153 See id. at 824.  The Supreme Court stated: 
A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of 
another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be 
affected . . . . It may seek to disseminate information so as to  enable its citizens 
to make better informed decisions when they leave.  But it may not, under the 
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from 
disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that state. 
Id. 
 154 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 155 Id. at 762. 
 156 See id. at 770. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557 (1980). 
 159 Id. 
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Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, [3] we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.160 
A majority of the Supreme Court still utilizes the four-part 
Central Hudson framework today to evaluate commercial speech 
cases.161 
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court held that a New York 
regulation that banned advertising by electric utility companies 
was “more extensive than necessary” and violated the First 
Amendment.162  The majority emphasized that “blanket bans” on 
commercial speech should be reviewed with “special care,”163 
since special concerns arise from “regulations that entirely 
suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related 
policy,” which “could screen from public view the underlying 
governmental policy.”164  Hence, the Supreme Court dramatically 
altered the First Amendment landscape between 1975 and 1980 by 
 
 160 Id. at 566 (numbering added for clarity). 
 161 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001) (“But here, 
as in Greater New Orleans, we see ‘no need to break new ground.  Central Hudson, as 
applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for 
decision.’”).  Recently, certain judges and scholars have “advocated repudiation of the 
Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more straightforward and stringent test 
for asserting the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech.” Greater 
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999).  Contemporary 
case law indicates that the Court itself is not completely content with the Central Hudson 
test and would prefer something stricter; for example, Justice Thomas has repeatedly 
called for the replacement of the Central Hudson test. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).  Nevertheless, the 
majority of the Court’s current position is that although “reasonable judges may disagree 
about the merits” of repudiating the Central Hudson standard, it is: 
an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that we do not ordinarily 
reach out to make novel or unnecessarily broad pronouncements on 
constitutional issues when a case can be fully resolved on a  narrower ground.  
In this case, there is no need to break new ground.  Central Hudson, as applied 
in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for 
decision. 
Greater New Orleans, 517 U.S. at 184 (internal citations omitted). 
 162 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572. 
 163 Id. at 566 & n.9. 
 164 Id. 
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extending First Amendment protection to purely commercial 
speech and crafting a framework to analyze commercial speech to 
determine if it warranted First Amendment protection. 
2. The Paternalistic Approach: Early First Amendment 
Challenges to Gambling Advertising Restrictions 
The gambling advertising restrictions embedded in the 
Communications Act and similar state statutes165 have been subject 
to numerous First Amendment challenges over the past twenty 
years.166  In the early cases, the Supreme Court took a deferential 
approach to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, 
submitting to the government’s interest in regulating commercial 
speech pertaining to “vice” activities like gambling. 
The 1986 case Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism 
Company of Puerto Rico167 was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court analyzed a gambling promotion restriction under 
the Central Hudson test, and provides a clear example of the 
Court’s initial willingness to defer to “paternalistic” governmental 
interests in restricting gambling advertising.168  In Posadas, the 
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican 
statute that legalized certain forms of casino gambling in Puerto 
Rico in order to develop tourism but provided that “no gambling 
room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their 
facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.”169 
The Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico’s commercial 
speech restriction was reasonable and permissible under the First 
Amendment.170  In step one of the Central Hudson test, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment was 
implicated because the advertisements would concern lawful 
activity and would not be misleading or fraudulent.171  In step two, 
 
 165 Walters, supra note 8, at 112; see also supra notes 112–129 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 167–238 and accompanying text. 
 167 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 168 Id. at 340–41. 
 169 Id. at 332 (citing Puerto Rico Games of Chance Act of 1948, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, 
§ 77 (1972)). 
 170 Id. at 348. 
 171 Id. at 340–41. 
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the Court found that Puerto Rico had a “substantial” interest in 
protecting its citizens from gambling’s serious harmful effects on 
the public health, safety, and welfare.172  In step three, the Court 
had no trouble concluding that the advertising restrictions “directly 
advanced” the government’s asserted interest: the Puerto Rican 
Legislature had been reasonable in believing that “advertising of 
casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve 
to increase the demand for the product advertised.”173  Finally, in 
step four, the Court found that the broadcast regulations were not 
“more extensive than necessary” to serve the Puerto Rico’s 
interests, given that Puerto Rico could have banned casino 
gambling altogether.174 
The Court rejected the broadcasters’ argument that in choosing 
to legalize casino gambling the Legislature was prohibited by the 
First Amendment from using advertising restrictions to reduce 
demand for such gambling.175  Instead, the Court maintained that 
“the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily 
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling.”176  Therefore, the Court deferred to the Puerto Rico 
Legislature’s decision that restricting advertising was the most 
effective way to reduce the demand for casino gambling.177 
Seven years after Posadas, the Supreme Court entertained a 
challenge to the Communications Act and again permitted a 
gambling advertising prohibition by deferring to the paternalistic 
governmental interest in protecting the public.178  In the 1993 case 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,179 a radio station licensed 
in North Carolina, which was a non-lottery state, wished to 
 
 172 Id. at 341.  The Court was concerned that Puerto Rican residents would have their 
“moral and cultural patterns” disrupted, crime and prostitution would increase, and 
organized crime rings would develop. Id. 
 173 Id. at 341–42. 
 174 Id. at 343–44; Walters, supra note 8, at 113. 
 175 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46. 
 176 Id.  The Court reasoned “it is precisely because the government could have enacted a 
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government 
to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through 
restrictions on advertising.” Id. at 346. 
 177 See id. at 344. 
 178 See generally United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 179 Id. 
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broadcast lottery advertisements to its listeners in the nearby state 
of Virginia.180  The radio station sought a declaration that the 
CGACA, which exempts state-run casinos and certain other 
gambling schemes from the Communications Act, violated its First 
Amendment rights.181 
In applying the four-factor Central Hudson test, the Supreme 
Court found that the Communications Act, as amended by the 
CGACA, regulated lawful activity and “directly advanced” the 
government’s interest in supporting the anti-gambling laws of one 
state without unduly interfering with the pro-gambling laws of 
another state.182  The Court also found the broadcast restrictions to 
be “reasonably fit” on the basis that the government’s interest 
could not be achieved as effectively without the regulation.183  
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the Communications Act as 
applied to the North Carolina radio station, indicating that the 
Supreme Court’s early review of the Central Hudson factors was 
concerned more with form than substance.184 
3. The Modern Analytical Framework: Recent Challenges to 
Advertising Restrictions on Gambling and Other “Vice” 
Activities 
The Supreme Court continues to utilize the Central Hudson 
framework.  However, the  means by which the Court evaluates 
each prong has evolved from a paternalistic approach that gave the 
government latitude to restrict advertising for “vice” activities185 to 
an approach that gave more leeway to advertisers and allowed 
 
 180 Id. at 423–24. 
 181 Id. at 424. 
 182 See id. at 433–34.  The Court reasoned that “allowing Edge Broadcasting to carry the 
lottery advertisements to North Carolina residents would be in derogation of the federal 
interest supporting the state’s anti-lottery laws and would permit Virginia’s lottery laws 
to dictate what stations a neighboring state may air.” Walters, supra note 8, at 113; see 
also Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 434. 
 183 Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 429–30. 
 184 See id. at 435; Burke, supra note 127, at 493–94. 
 185 See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 336 (1986) 
(noting that the Court was concerned with the citizens of Puerto Rico being subject to, 
and “invited” to participate in, the gambling which was being advertised to tourists). 
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more information to be disseminated to the public.186  In fact, in 
the same year the Supreme Court decided the deferential Edge 
Broadcasting case, the Court began to alter its Central Hudson 
analysis by putting an increasingly high burden on the government 
to justify its bans on commercial speech.187 
In the 1993 case Edenfield v. Fane,188 the Supreme Court 
toughened its analysis of Central Hudson’s third factor.189  The 
Court announced that the government would carry the burden of 
showing that the challenged regulation advanced the government’s 
interest “in a direct and material way.”190  Furthermore, this burden 
cannot be “satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a 
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial 
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that 
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”191  
The Edenfield Court emphasized that this requirement was critical 
to prevent a state from easily restricting commercial speech “in the 
service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a 
burden on commercial expression.”192 
Two years later, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,193 the 
Supreme Court departed further from its deferential approach as it 
increased the government’s burden in steps three and four of the 
Central Hudson analysis and held that speech restrictions would be 
invalid in cases where the government’s actions were irrational, 
 
 186 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (noting that 
while the State of Massachusetts might have justified concerns for wanting to restrict 
cigarette ads, the ads are nonetheless afforded First Amendment protection because 
otherwise the government’s ability to restrict activities that it characterized as a “vice 
activity” would be “limitless”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173, 191 (1999) (“Even putting aside the broadcast exemptions for arguably 
distinguishable sorts of gambling that might also give rise to social costs about which the 
Federal Government is concerned . . . the Government presents no convincing reason for 
pegging its speech ban to the identity of the owners or operators of the advertised 
casinos.”). 
 187 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 767. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 770–71. 
 192 Id. at 771. 
 193 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
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contradictory, or not supported by substantial evidence.194  In 
Rubin, the Court struck down a federal law that prohibited 
displaying alcohol content on beer labels.195  The Court first stated 
that neither “Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft 
an exception to the Central Hudson standard” for vice activities.196  
The Court then concluded that under the stricter step three standard 
developed in Edenfield, the labeling restriction did not “directly 
and materially” advance the government’s asserted interest in 
discouraging “strength wars” between brewers because of the 
“overall irrationality of the Government’s regulatory scheme.”197  
The scheme was irrational because it did not prohibit the disclosure 
of alcohol content in advertising, and was not based on any 
convincing evidence that the labeling ban actually inhibited 
“strength wars.”198  The Court also found that the speech 
regulation failed step four of the Central Hudson test because the 
government had less intrusive alternatives available.199  Thus, 
Rubin marked a departure from the Court’s prior analysis by 
requiring more than “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” for 
the government’s commercial speech restrictions to pass steps 
three and four of the Central Hudson test.200 
The following year, building upon the Edenfield and Rubin 
decisions, the Supreme Court significantly changed the way 
gambling advertising challenges were analyzed, casting doubt on 
the prior reasoning in Posadas and Edge.201  In 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island,202 the Court heard an appeal by Rhode Island 
alcohol retailers who sought a declaratory judgment that two 
Rhode Island laws prohibiting alcohol price advertisements 
violated the First Amendment.203  The parties stipulated that the 
 
 194 See id. at 488. 
 195 See id. at 491. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 488. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 491. 
 200 Id.; see also Burke, supra note 127, at 494. 
 201 See Walters, supra note 8, at 113. 
 202 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 203 Id. at 493.  The Court noted that the regulations had to be reviewed with “special 
care” because they constituted “blanket bans” on truthful, non-misleading commercial 
speech. Id. at 504 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
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proposed advertisements did not concern illegal activity and would 
not be false or misleading.204  Under step two of the Central 
Hudson analysis, the Court expressed skepticism, but accepted as 
“substantial” Rhode Island’s proffered interests in promoting 
temperance.205  In the third step, the Court noted that because the 
regulation constituted a blanket ban, Rhode Island was required to 
show that “the price advertising ban will significantly reduce 
alcohol consumption.”206  The State failed this test because the 
evidence it provided merely “suggest[ed] that the price advertising 
ban may have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate 
drinkers.”207  Similarly, in the fourth step, the State did not prove 
that its speech neglected to “establish a ‘reasonable fit’ between its 
abridgement of speech and its temperance goal.”208 
In addition, the Court acknowledged that “Posadas erroneously 
performed the First Amendment analysis”209 and announced: 
[A] state legislature does not have the broad discretion to 
suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for 
paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was 
willing to tolerate.  As we explained in Virginia Bd. of 
Pharmacy, “[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between 
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of 
its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment 
makes for us.”210 
Thus, the Court rejected the “legislative judgment” leniency 
endorsed by the Posadas majority.211  The Court also discarded 
 
447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).  Following its reasoning in Central Hudson, the Court 
explained that blanket bans “usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the 
public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. . . . [and] [t]he First Amendment directs us 
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good.” Id. at 503 (internal citation omitted). 
 204 Id. at 493. 
 205 Id. at 504. 
 206 Id. at 505. 
 207 Id. at 506. 
 208 Id. at 507 (internal citation omitted). 
 209 Id. at 509. 
 210 Id. at 510 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
 211 Id. at 508, 510. 
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Posadas’ theory that the power to completely ban casino gambling 
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling.212  Finally, the Court rejected Rhode Island’s contention 
that the price advertising ban should be upheld because it targeted 
commercial speech pertaining to a “vice” activity.213  Therefore, in 
44 Liquormart, the Supreme Court abandoned the broad legislative 
discretion it once had tolerated, holding that the Rhode Island 
statutes failed the Central Hudson test and violated the First 
Amendment.214 
Under this framework, the Supreme Court readdressed the 
constitutionality of the Communications Act in the 1999 case 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. U.S.,215 and held that 
the statute’s numerous exceptions rendered it unconstitutional as 
applied to private casino gambling advertisements in states where 
such gambling was legal.216  In this case, an association of New 
Orleans-area broadcasters that operated FCC-licensed radio and 
television stations filed suit against the United States and the FCC 
for a declaration that the Communications Act and FCC’s 
implementing regulation, which prohibited broadcasters from 
carrying advertisements about privately-operated commercial 
casinos regardless of the location of the station or casino, violated 
the First Amendment.217 
 
 212 Id. at 510–13.  The Court stated that it was now “quite clear that banning speech may 
sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.” Id. at 511. 
 213 Id. at 513.  Noting that it has rejected this argument the previous year in Rubin, the 
Court reiterated its fear that the scope of any “vice” exception would allow state 
legislatures to justify censorship by simply putting a “vice” label on selected activities or 
requiring courts “to establish a federal common law of vice.” Id. at 514. 
 214 Id. at 516.  The following year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. 
District Court for New Jersey both considered challenges to gambling broadcasting 
regulations under the Communications Act, and utilized the Supreme Court’s 44 
Liquormart rationale to depart from earlier interpretations of this federal broadcast ban. 
See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997); Players Int’l v. 
United States, 988 F. Supp 497 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 215 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
 216 See id. at 176, 190. 
 217 See id. at 180–81.  The broadcasters wished to broadcast advertisements for private 
casinos that were lawful in Louisiana and neighboring Mississippi, but feared sanctions 
because “signals from Louisiana broadcasting stations [could sometimes] be heard in 
neighboring states, including Texas and Arkansas, where private casino gambling [was] 
unlawful.” Id. 
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The parties stipulated that the advertisements would satisfy the 
first step of the Central Hudson test.218  Under step two, the 
government identified its interests as: reducing the social costs 
associated with gambling, such as compulsive gambling; stopping 
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal conduct; 
and assisting those states that wish to restrict gambling or prohibit 
casino gambling within their borders.219  The Court accepted the 
government’s interest as “substantial.”220  However, it noted that 
this conclusion was “by no means self-evident,”221 given that “the 
social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset, 
and sometimes outweighed, by countervailing policy 
considerations, primarily in the form of economic benefits.”222  
The Court pointed out that “[d]espite its awareness of the potential 
social costs, Congress has not only sanctioned casino gambling for 
Indian tribes . . . but has enacted other statutes that reflect approval 
of state legislation that authorizes a host of public and private 
gambling activities.”223 
After voicing its reservations about the government’s interest, 
the Supreme Court analyzed the broadcast restrictions under the 
third and forth prongs of the Central Hudson test and held that as 
applied to the broadcasters’ case, the Communications Act violated 
the First Amendment.224  Regarding step three, the Court stated 
that the “operation of [the Communications Act] and its attendant 
regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies 
that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”225  In step four, 
the Court found that the regulations were more extensive than 
necessary, noting that there “surely are practical and nonspeech-
related forms of regulation . . . that could more directly and 
effectively alleviate some of the social costs of casino 
gambling.”226  The Court explained that if the federal government 
 
 218 See id. at 184. 
 219 See id. at 185. 
 220 Id. at 186. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 186–87. 
 224 See id. at 188–96. 
 225 Id. (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995)). 
 226 Id. at 192. 
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had “adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights 
of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct, 
this might be a different case.”227  Finally, the Court pronounced 
that “the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does 
not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech 
about that conduct.228 . . . It is well settled that the First 
Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of governmental restrictions 
on speech than of its regulation of commerce alone.”229  Due to the 
contradictory nature of the government’s proffered interests and 
regulations, Greater New Orleans further expanded the First 
Amendment protections for gambling advertisements by rendering 
the Communications Act unenforceable against casino gambling 
advertisements in any state where casino gambling was legal.230 
Finally, the 2001 case Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly231 
demonstrates the strict scrutiny with which the Supreme Court now 
analyzes the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.232  
In this case, a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers 
challenged regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney 
General regarding “the advertisement and sale of cigarettes, 
smokeless tobacco, and cigars.”233  The first regulation at issue 
prohibited outdoor advertisements for smokeless tobacco and 
cigars within one thousand feet of a school or playground.234  The 
Supreme Court found that this regulation satisfied step three of the 
Central Hudson test because the State had presented sufficient 
evidence of a link between smokeless tobacco and cigar 
advertising and demand.235  Under step four, however, the 
Supreme Court found that the regulation was more extensive than 
necessary to advance the state’s interest.236  The “breadth and 
 
 227 Id. at 195 (internal citation omitted). 
 228 Id. at 193 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509–11 (1996)). 
 229 Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
 230 See id. at 195–96. 
 231 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 232 See generally id. 
 233 See id. at 532. 
 234 See id. at 536. 
 235 Id. at 561 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)). 
 236 See id. (“[T]he ‘critical inquiry in this case,’ requires a reasonable fit between the 
means and ends of the regulatory scheme.  The Attorney General’s regulations do not 
meet this standard.”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
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scope of the regulations,” which would have prevented all 
advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston, Worcester, and Springfield, 
Massachusetts, were too pervasive to be considered narrowly 
tailored.237  Further, the “process by which the Attorney General 
[had] adopted the regulations d[id] not demonstrate a careful 
calculation of the speech interests involved.”238 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech 
has undergone an enormous transformation over the past thirty 
years.  Until the 1970s, commercial speech was afforded no First 
Amendment protection.239  Since Bigelow was decided in 1975, 
however, the Supreme Court has applied increasingly strict 
scrutiny to governmental attempts to restrict advertising, even for 
“vice” activities like gambling.240  For a gambling advertising 
prohibition to survive a First Amendment challenge today, the 
government must either demonstrate that the specific form of 
gambling is illegal under federal or state law, or prove through 
substantial evidence that the government’s interest is “substantial,” 
that the regulation “directly and materially” advances the asserted 
 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980)).  The Court reiterated that step four requires a 
reasonable “fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends, . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Id. at 556 (quoting 
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995)). 
 237 Id. at 561–62. 
 238 Id. at 562.  The second Massachusetts regulation at issue was a blanket point-of-sale 
advertising restriction that required indoor advertisements to be placed no lower than five 
feet from the floor. Id. at 566.  The Court held this regulation failed both the third and 
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test because it did not reasonably fit with 
Massachusetts’ goal of curbing the demand of tobacco products and preventing minors 
from using them. Id.  The Court noted that “[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and 
those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings.” Id.  
The third regulation barred self-service displays for tobacco.  The Court held this 
restriction did withstand First Amendment scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to 
prevent access to tobacco products by minors. Id. at 569–70. 
 239 David L. Hudson, Jr., Bates Participants Reflect on Landmark Case, at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=14394 (Nov. 18, 2004) ([F]or the 
vast majority of the 20th century advertising was not entitled to First Amendment 
protection at all.  In its 1942 decision Valentine v. Chrestensen the U.S. Supreme Court 
wrote: ‘We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising.’  It wasn’t until the mid-1970s 
that the U.S. Supreme Court granted commercial speech a degree of First Amendment 
protection.). 
 240 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824–25 (1975). 
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governmental interest, and that there is a “reasonable fit” between 
the restriction and the asserted interest that demonstrates a careful 
calculation of the speech interests involved.241  The Supreme Court 
has not yet had an opportunity to apply these standards to Internet 
gambling advertisements.  However, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana will soon have the occasion to decide 
whether the DOJ’s Internet gambling advertising restrictions 
satisfy the current Central Hudson standards, or whether Casino 
City is correct that the DOJ cannot overcome this threshold.242 
II. CASINO CITY VERSUS THE DOJ: THE LEGAL BATTLEGROUND 
As discussed in Part I, the United States government contends 
that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law, and that, as a 
result, the advertising of gambling websites is not protected by the 
First Amendment and constitutes “aiding and abetting” illegal 
activity.243  Conversely, Casino City argues Internet gambling is 
legal, and, thus, it has a First Amendment right to advertise online 
casinos and sportsbooks.244  As such, the first issue in this 
controversy is whether Internet gambling is illegal activity under 
federal law.  The second issue is whether Internet gambling 
advertising is protected by the First Amendment.  If Internet 
gambling is illegal under the Wire Act or other federal laws, 
advertisements for this activity will fail the first step of the Central 
Hudson analysis and will not be protected by the First 
Amendment.245  But, if federal law cannot be interpreted to outlaw 
Internet gambling, Casino City will prevail unless the DOJ can 
satisfy the increasingly strict second, third, and fourth prongs of 
the Central Hudson test.246 
 
 241 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
 242 See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 244 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 245 Cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
564–66 (1980) (“[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the 
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the 
government’s purpose.”). 
 246 Id. at 566; see supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Court’s increasing strictness in 
applying the Central Hudson test). 
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A. The DOJ’s Case for Prohibiting Online Casino Advertising 
In its June 2003 letter, the DOJ advised the National 
Association of Broadcasters and other media groups that anyone 
who placed advertisements for offshore sportsbooks or online 
casinos could be violating various federal and state laws, including 
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business 
Act.247  Further, the DOJ warned that these advertisers may be 
subject to prosecution for aiding and abetting illegal activities, 
pursuant to the federal “aiding and abetting” statute.248  In its 
October 29, 2004 motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the 
DOJ proffered two main arguments in support of its position.  
First, the DOJ’s actions did not violate the First Amendment 
because it addressed only the advertising of “unlawful” activity.249  
Therefore, “Casino City’s claim fails as a matter of law, for it is 
well-established that there is no First Amendment right to advertise 
illegal activity.”250  Second, the DOJ’s actions satisfied the 
remaining elements of the Central Hudson test, “which . . . are 
implicated only if the challenged restrictions regulate speech that is 
not misleading and does not concern unlawful activity.”251  The 
DOJ argues that Internet and offshore gambling operations are 
“particularly pernicious because they can be accessed so easily by 
anyone in the country, including particularly vulnerable 
populations such as children and compulsive gamblers . . . and also 
due to the potential for fraud and money laundering.”252  
Therefore, the DOJ maintains that the challenged commercial 
speech restrictions would be valid even if Internet gambling was 
legal.253 
 
 247 Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18-19, 
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed 
Aug. 9, 2004). 
 250 Id. at 17 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64). 
 251 Id. at 19.  The government also argued that Casino City had no standing to bring the 
case, but this argument is not considered in this Note. See id. at 7–15. 
 252 Id. at 21. 
 253 See id. at 20–21. 
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1. Internet Gambling is Illegal under Federal Law 
The crux of the federal government’s argument is that “the 
First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to 
illegal activity.”254  Indeed, in its motion to dismiss, the DOJ stated 
that, by definition, “the only speech at issue that the letter [to the 
National Association of Broadcasters] identifies as even potentially 
subject to criminal liability is speech that is advertising illegal 
activity.”255  The DOJ contends that Internet gambling is illegal 
under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act.256 
a) The Wire Act Outlaws Internet Gambling 
The DOJ relies primarily on the Wire Act to support its 
contention that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law.257  
The Wire Act expressly outlaws gambling over the “wires,” as 
opposed to merely facilitating the enforcement of existing state or 
local gambling laws.  Although Congress promulgated the Wire 
Act before the Internet existed, the federal government argues that 
“if an Internet gaming Web site operating in any country 
(including the United States) receives a bet transmitted by an 
individual located in the United States, the operator has violated 
the Wire Act.  For this reason, foreign entities offering gambling to 
U.S. citizens through the Internet would be subject to the Wire 
Act.”258 
The federal government’s broad interpretation of the Wire Act 
is supported by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  In United 
States v. Cohen,259 the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Wire Act 
gave the DOJ a mechanism to “harness a sector of the to-date 
illusive Internet gambling business.”260  In this case, Jay Cohen 
 
 254 Id. at 18. 
 255 Id. at 19. 
 256 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 257 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, 
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed 
Aug. 9, 2004). 
 258 GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 12. 
 259 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 260 McGinty, supra note 85, at 207. 
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was prosecuted for operating an Internet bookmaking operation in 
Antigua called the World Sports Exchange (“WSE”), which 
customers would contact via the Internet or telephone to place 
bets.261  A jury convicted Cohen for conspiracy and substantial 
offenses in violation of the Wire Act,262 and the Second Circuit 
upheld his conviction263 holding that that WSE had engaged in 
transmission of bets that were illegal under the Wire Act.264 
First, the court rejected Cohen’s argument that the safe harbor 
provision of the Wire Act applied to this case.  The court reasoned, 
“[b]etting is illegal in New York, and thus the safe-harbor 
provision in § 1084(b) cannot apply in Cohen’s case as a matter of 
law.”265  Next, the court analyzed Cohen’s argument that the 
transmissions between his system and customers were limited to 
information that enabled customers to place bets entirely from their 
accounts in Antigua, where such betting was legal.266  The court 
noted that the Wire Act prohibited the transmission of information 
assisting in the placing of bets as well as the transmission of bets 
themselves.267  Since Internet betting was illegal in New York, 
Cohen could not have benefited from the safe harbor even if WSE 
had only transmitted betting information as opposed to actual 
bets.268 
 
 261 Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70. 
 262 Id. at 71.  At Cohen’s trial, the judge gave the jury the following instruction: 
If there was a telephone call or an internet transmission between New York and 
[WSE] in Antigua, and if a person in New York said or signaled that he or she 
wanted to place a specified bet, and if a person on an internet device or a 
telephone said or signaled that the bet was accepted, this was the transmission 
of a bet within the meaning of Section 1084.  Congress clearly did not intend to 
have this statute be made inapplicable because the party in a foreign gambling 
business deemed or construed the transmissions only starting with an employee 
in an internet mechanism located on the premises in the foreign country. 
 Id. at 74–75. 
 263 See id. at 78. 
 264 See id. at 75–76.  The Supreme Court denied Cohen’s petition for writ of certiorari. 
Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002). 
 265 Id. at 74. 
 266 See id. at 74–75. 
 267 See id. at 75 (emphasis added). 
 268 See id. (emphasis added). 
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The Second Circuit “took a strong stand against Internet 
gambling” in Cohen,269 putting “all offshore Internet gambling 
businesses . . . on notice that they may be criminally liable if they 
accept bets transmitted from within the U.S.”270  In addition, at 
least two other courts have indicated that offshore Internet casinos 
that accept bets from United States customers violate the Wire Act.  
In United States v. Kaczowski,271 the Western District of New York 
court found that an online gambling operation had potentially 
violated the Wire Act, Travel Act, and various New York state 
laws prohibiting the promotion of gambling.272  Further, in People 
ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,273 a New York 
state court prohibited the continued operation of an Antiguan 
online gambling company it found to have violated the Wire Act 
and other federal gambling and securities laws.274  Based on this 
precedent and the plain meaning of the statute, the DOJ argues that 
gambling via online sportsbooks and casinos is illegal under the 
Wire Act.275 
b) The Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act 
Outlaw Internet Gambling 
In addition to the Wire Act, the DOJ also cites the Travel 
Act276 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act277 in support of its 
position that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law.  The 
federal government contends that these are “[t]he two other federal 
 
 269 Manter, supra note 6, at 12. 
 270 Id. at 14.  According to one legal analyst: 
If the analysis in the Cohen case is accepted by other courts, it could spell the 
death knell for participation in the online gaming industry in the United States, 
absent legislation approving it.  Even affiliate promotion of [online] casino 
websites under the court’s reasoning could result in criminal sanctions against 
the unsuspecting webmaster.  Although the First Amendment is implicated by 
any attempt to regulate truthful speech about a legal product or service, the 
concerns created by this court decision are real. 
Walters, supra note 110, at 447. 
 271 114 F. Supp. 2d 143 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 272 Id. at 151–55. 
 273 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
 274 Id. at 861–63. 
 275 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 276 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 277 See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000). 
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statutes with direct applicability to Internet gambling.”278  The 
government states that “gambling over the Internet generally 
would violate the Travel Act because an interstate facility, the 
Internet, is used to conduct gambling” with American 
consumers.279  However, a conviction under the Travel Act 
requires a predicate violation of either a state or federal law,280 so 
it merely provides remedies and enforcement power for other 
existing laws, as opposed to making any form of gambling illegal 
on its face.281  The same is true for the Illegal Gambling Business 
Act.282  Due to this inherent limitation, the DOJ has not relied 
heavily on these statutes.283  In its motion to dismiss Casino City’s 
complaint, the DOJ did not offer any justification as to why it 
believed Internet gambling was illegal under the Travel Act or the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act.284 
2. Internet Gambling Advertisers are “Aiding and Abetting” 
Illegal Activity 
As a result of its belief that online gambling is illegal, the 
Justice Department argues that American companies that advertise 
gambling websites are “aiding and abetting” illegal activity,285 and 
can be prosecuted for violating federal law under the “aiding and 
abetting” statute.286  This statute requires a showing that the 
defendant willfully associated itself with a criminal enterprise.287  
The courts have not clarified how far from the actual placing of 
bets a company must be to avoid a charge of aiding and abetting or 
conspiracy to violate gambling laws.288  However, the DOJ is 
 
 278 GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13. 
 279 Id. at 14. 
 280 Rodefer, supra note 95 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1952). 
 281 See generally id. 
 282 Rodefer, supra note 103. 
 283 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
passim, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. 
filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
 284 See id. 
 285 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 286 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see also discussion supra Part I.A.3.e. 
 287 Walters, supra note 110, at 446. 
 288 See id. at 447. 
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attempting to prosecute Internet gambling advertisers under the 
“aiding and abetting” statute on the theory that there is a direct link 
between the advertisements and online gambling websites, in that 
offshore gambling websites would be unable to reach American 
consumers without advertising.289 
3. Internet Gambling Advertising Restrictions Satisfy the 
Central Hudson Test 
In its motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the Justice 
Department maintains that it could constitutionally prohibit 
Internet gambling advertising even if the underlying activity were 
legal.290  The basis of this contention is that an online gambling 
advertising prohibition would “readily satisf[y] the remaining three 
elements of the Central Hudson test, which are implicated only by 
restrictions on speech that is not misleading and does not relate to 
unlawful activity.”291 
The DOJ argues that its actions satisfy step two of the Central 
Hudson test because it has a “substantial interest in the 
enforcement of its criminal laws, and more specifically, in 
reducing aid to illegal gambling operations.”292  The government 
cites the cases of Edge Broadcasting,293 Greater New Orleans,294 
and Posadas295 as proof that “the Supreme Court has specifically 
noted that the government has a substantial interest in reducing 
gambling by regulating gambling advertising.”296  In addition, the 
DOJ states that “whatever the federal government’s interest in 
reducing legal gambling activity, there is no basis for contending 
that the government lacks a substantial intent in enforcing laws 
proscribing illegal gambling.”297 
 
 289 See Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 290 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19–22, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 291 Id. at 17. 
 292 Id. at 19–20. 
 293 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 294 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999). 
 295 Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986). 
 296 Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 12, Casino City (No. 04-
557-B-M3) (emphasis added). 
 297 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The government points to the dangerous nature of online 
gambling to further substantiate its interest in preventing online 
gambling advertising.298  In its motion to dismiss, the DOJ argues 
that Internet and offshore sportsbook gambling operations are 
“particularly pernicious because they can be accessed so easily by 
anyone in the country, including particularly vulnerable 
populations such as children and compulsive gamblers, via a 
computer or telephone, and also due to the potential for fraud and 
money laundering.”299  Because these issues make Internet 
gambling different from, and arguably more dangerous than, 
traditional casino gambling, “[e]ven persons who endorse 
traditional gambling may have concerns about the unique nature of 
Internet gambling.”300 
The DOJ’s interest in defending the country against money 
laundering by terrorists and organized crime gained prominence 
after September 11, 2001.301  United States Representative James 
Leach (R-Iowa) introduced an online gambling prohibition into the 
early drafts of the USA PATRIOT ACT (“Patriot Act”),302 arguing 
that “Internet gambling provided a forum for terrorists to launder 
money.”303  The House Financial Services Committee, Justice 
Department, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) all 
lobbied in support of this bill,304 and House and Senate negotiators 
agreed to include it in the Patriot Act.305  However, other 
legislators opposed the bill, contending that the connection 
 
 298 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 299 Id.  Indeed, the policy reasons most often cited in support of an Internet gambling 
prohibition are the risk of money laundering by terrorists and organized crime, the risk of 
fraud due to the difficulty to regulate the Internet, the potential increase in gambling 
addictions, and the inability to control adolescent access. See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5; 
McGinty, supra note 85, at 206.  
 300 McGinty, supra note 85, at 206. 
 301 See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5; see also supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 302 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 303 Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5. 
 304 See Mark D. Schopper, Comment, Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash & Money 
Laundering: The Unintended Consequences of a Monetary Control Scheme, 5 CHAP. L. 
REV. 303, 309 (2002). 
 305 See id. 
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between Internet gambling and terrorism was too weak to warrant 
including this provision in the broader money-laundering 
legislation.306  The measure was ultimately dropped from the final 
draft of the Patriot Act due to a lack of evidence supporting such a 
connection.307  Nevertheless, many government officials continue 
to believe that terrorist cells and other dangerous groups are 
utilizing gambling websites to launder the proceeds of their illegal 
operations.308  And as discussed in Part I, members of Congress are 
still trying to promulgate similar legislation to prohibit Internet 
gambling.309 
The government’s second proffered interest is protecting 
Americans from fraud.  Internet gambling raises legitimate 
concerns about consumer fraud that do not apply to land-based 
gambling.310  Casinos operating outside the United States cannot 
be regulated by federal or state governments to prevent fraud, and 
could escape penalties imposed upon them by American laws and 
courts.311  As a result, online gamblers could have difficulty 
receiving their winnings, and could not be certain that the online 
casino was operating its games “fairly and with the same degree of 
chance as land-based games.”312  Conversely, if Internet gambling 
websites were licensed within the United States, regulations could 
be established to prevent fraud.313  For example, payouts could be 
audited to ensure they were fair, and software codes could be 
checked to ensure that games of chance were not rigged.314 
Third, the DOJ and other proponents of anti-Internet gambling 
legislation argue that Internet gambling amplifies the issue of 
“problem gaming.”315  While “brick-and-mortar gambling 
establishments [have established] safeguards against gambling 
addiction and underage gambling[, Internet] gamblers remain 
 
 306 Id. at 310. 
 307 Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5. 
 308 See generally discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 309 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 310 See Lang, supra note 26, at 548–49. 
 311 See id. at 549. 
 312 Id. at 548. 
 313 See id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 6. 
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anonymous and often use credit cards when placing bets.”316  Also, 
“there is no ‘tangible representation of money’ such as betting 
chips for users to visualize how much they have won or lost.”317  
As a result, “[a]ddicted players [could] lose a life savings or create 
thousands of dollars of debt without leaving their home[s].”318  The 
anonymous nature of Internet gambling also enables underage 
adolescents to bet online, since it is impossible to verify a player’s 
age.319 
The Justice Department contends that its crackdown on Internet 
gambling advertising also satisfies the third and fourth steps of the 
Central Hudson analysis.320  Given that “Internet and offshore 
gambling operations pose a unique threat of vastly increasing the 
pervasiveness and easy accessibility of various types of 
gambling,”321 the DOJ reasons: 
By punishing and deterring advertising for such operations, 
the challenged application “directly advance[s]” the goal of 
the statute by reducing the ability of such operations to 
solicit customers.  There is more than a “reasonable fit” 
between this goal and the method of advancing it that 
plaintiff challenges in this case.  In fact, this application 
could not be any more narrowly tailored because it only 
prohibits the advertising of illegal activities, and only when 
such conduct violates the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2.322 
Furthermore, “the connection between advertising an activity 
and increased incidence of the activity is the very reason that 
Internet gambling businesses pay Casino City money to advertise 
for them, and indeed, it is the foundation upon which the entire 
 
 316 Id. 
 317 Lang, supra note 26, at 550 (citing Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next 
Millennium: A Look into the Proposed Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 413, 419 (2000)). 
 318 Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 6. 
 319 See Lang, supra note 26, at 547. 
 320 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, 
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed 
Aug. 9, 2004). 
 321 Id. at 22. 
 322 Id. 
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advertising industry rests.”323  Thus, even if Internet gambling 
were legal under federal law, the challenged advertising 
restrictions are narrowly tailored and no more restrictive than 
necessary given the unique and serious threat to American interests 
posed by online gambling.324 
In sum, the federal government contends that Internet gambling 
is illegal under federal law and that its actions satisfy the Central 
Hudson requirements for regulating commercial speech.325  The 
DOJ’s legality argument rests on its contention that online 
gambling is illegal under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act, and that there is no First 
Amendment right to advertise illegal activity.326  Under step two of 
the Central Hudson test, the DOJ argues that it has a substantial 
interest in enforcing its criminal laws and protecting against money 
laundering, consumer fraud, gambling addiction, and adolescent 
gambling.327  The government also argues that its actions also 
satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson analysis 
because they are narrowly tailored and no more restrictive than 
necessary.328  In contrast, Casino City asserts that online gambling 
is legal under federal law and that the First Amendment protects its 
advertising. 
B. Casino City’s Case that the DOJ’s Ban on Internet Casino 
Advertising Violates the First Amendment 
In its complaint against the Department of Justice, Casino City 
contended that the DOJ’s application of the Wire Act, Travel Act, 
Illegal Gambling Business Act, and “aiding and abetting” statute 
against it and other similarly situated entities would constitute a 
 
 323 Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 13, Casino City (No. 04-
557-B-M3). 
 324 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 325 See id. at 2–3; Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 326 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 327 See id. at 19–20. 
 328 See id. at 22. 
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violation of their First Amendment rights because Internet 
gambling is a lawful activity.329  As such: 
(a) The United States does not have a substantial interest 
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free 
expression resulting from such application and the threat of such 
application; (b) [t]he threatened application would not effectively 
serve any purported governmental interest; and (c) [t]he 
application was not narrowly drawn to effectuate any purported 
government interest.330 
Furthermore, in its response to the DOJ’s motion to dismiss, 
Casino City argued that “the Internet creates a new challenge for 
the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to the First Amendment.”331  
Because advertisements placed on Casino City websites are 
accessible “anywhere in the world” through the Internet, 
“including places where the advertised activities are expressly 
legal and places where the advertised activities might be 
prohibited,”332 the “DOJ cannot assert that advertisements placed 
by Casino City concern per se illegal conduct, unprotected by the 
First Amendment.”333 
1. Internet Gambling is Lawful Activity 
On Casino City’s website, CEO Michael Corfman asserts that 
the “public has the right to see the wealth of information we 
provide on casinos and sportsbooks, and we have the First 
Amendment right to advertise online gaming on the web to support 
its free publication.”334  In its complaint, Casino City contends that 
the application of the Wire Act, Travel Act, Illegal Gambling 
Business Act, and “aiding and abetting” statute against it and 
others similarly situated violates the First Amendment.335  
Underlying this argument is Casino City’s belief that its 
 
 329 See Complaint at 2, 4–5, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 330 Id. at 3. 
 331 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 20, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 332 Id. at 18–19. 
 333 Id. at 21. 
 334 Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9. 
 335 See Complaint at 3–4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
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advertisements satisfy the first step of the Central Hudson test: 
they are about lawful activities and are not misleading.336  Adjunct 
to this argument is Casino City’s theory that gambling activity 
advertised via the Internet should not be deemed illegal under step 
one of the Central Hudson test if it is legal anywhere in the world, 
regardless of Internet gambling’s legality in the United States, 
since Internet advertisements are accessible “by persons located 
around the world where online sportsbooks and online casinos are 
not illegal.”337 
a) The Wire Act Does Not Outlaw Internet Gambling 
Casino City contests the DOJ’s position that the Wire Act 
prohibits Internet gambling.338  Although the Second Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Cohen339 supports the DOJ’s 
position,340 this decision is by no means fatal to Casino City’s case.  
First, the Second Circuit decision involved a sports betting 
website, and was silent on the legality of online casinos, for which 
Casino City also advertises.341  Second, at least one legal 
commentator has argued that the Cohen opinion was not forceful 
enough to have a significant effect on the legal landscape because 
the Second Circuit did not “use strong language in reference to 
Cohen’s Internet use or language to more justly include Internet 
use within the scope of the [Wire Act].”342  Had the court done so, 
it “could have added incentive and a reasonable precedent for 
future courts to make a gradual move toward defining the terms of 
the [Wire Act] to include Internet gambling transactions. . . . 
ultimately making the [Wire Act] an effective avenue to convict 
online sports wagering.”343 
Most importantly, the Second Circuit’s decision is not binding 
on the other circuits, and the only other circuit court to have 
 
 336 See id. 
 337 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 22, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 338 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a; see also Walters, supra note 110, at 445. 
 339 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 340 See supra notes 260–270 and accompanying text. 
 341 See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 342 McGinty, supra note 85, at 213–14. 
 343 Id. 
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addressed this issue decided in favor of Casino City’s position.344  
In the 2002 case In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that the Wire Act did not outlaw Internet gambling.345  Here, the 
plaintiffs filed suit against MasterCard International, Visa 
International, and the banks that issued their MasterCard and Visa 
credit cards346 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizational Act (“RICO”)347 seeking to avoid substantial debts 
they incurred when they used their credit cards to gamble at online 
casinos.348  The plaintiffs identified three substantive federal 
crimes—”violations of the Wire Act, mail fraud, and wire fraud”—
as predicates to the RICO violations.349  They alleged that the 
defendants, through their association with Internet casinos,350 
“participated in and aided and abetted conduct that violated various 
federal and state criminal laws applicable to Internet gambling.”351 
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not 
“show a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of 
unlawful debt.”352  Significantly, the plaintiffs could not rely on the 
Wire Act as a predicate offense because they had failed to allege 
they had engaged in Internet sports betting.353  The court reasoned 
that “[b]ecause the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet 
gambling, any debts incurred in connection with such gambling are 
not illegal.”354  Since the plaintiffs’ debts were legal, the 
defendants could not have acted fraudulently when they 
represented the plaintiffs’ debts as legal.355  Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs could not “rely on the federal mail or wire fraud statutes 
 
 344 See In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 345 See id.  This suit arose out of thirty-three virtually identical cases that were 
transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana through multidistrict litigation, two of 
which were selected as test cases and consolidated for pre-trial purposes. See In re 
MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 471 n.1 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d 313 F.3d 257 
(5th Cir. 2002). 
 346 See id. 
 347 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2000 & Supp. 2001). 
 348 See In re MasterCard Int’l, 313 F.3d at 259. 
 349 Id. at 262 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1341, 1343 (2000)). 
 350 See id. at 260. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. at 261. 
 353 See id. at 262–63. 
 354 Id. at 263. 
 355 Id. 
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to show RICO predicate acts” because they had failed “to allege 
that they relied upon the Defendant’s representations in deciding to 
gamble.”356  Finally, because “neither the Wire Act nor the mail 
and wire fraud statutes [could] serve as predicates,” the court noted 
that it did not have to “consider the other federal statutes identified 
by the Plaintiffs.”357  The court reasoned that the Travel Act and 
Illegal Gambling Business Act could “not serve as predicates here 
because the Defendants did not violate any applicable federal or 
state law.”358 
In In re MasterCard, the Fifth Circuit strongly stated that the 
Wire Act did not prohibit casino-style Internet gambling.359  
Casino City filed its action in the Middle District of Louisiana,360 
which is within the Fifth Circuit.  Presumably, Casino City expects 
that the Louisiana district court will follow the binding precedent 
of its jurisdiction and hold that non-sports related Internet 
gambling is lawful activity, and that the court will extend its 
holding to Internet sports gambling as well. 
b) The Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act Do 
Not Outlaw Internet Gambling 
In addition to the Wire Act, Casino City argues that the 
government’s application of the Travel Act361 and Illegal 
Gambling Business Act362 against it violates the First 
Amendment.363  Because these laws both require a predicate 
violation of state or local law,364 at most the DOJ can utilize them 
 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. n.27. 
 358 Id.  The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiffs were “independent actors who 
made a knowing and voluntary choice to engage in a course of conduct.” Id. at 264.  “In 
engaging in this conduct, they got exactly what they bargained for—gambling ‘chips’ 
with which they could place wagers.” Id.  Therefore, they could not “use RICO to avoid 
meeting obligations they voluntarily took on.” Id. 
 359 Although it implied that the Wire Act may prohibit online sports betting. See id. at 
262. 
 360 Complaint at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-
M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
 361 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 362 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000). 
 363 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 364 See Rodefer, supra note 95; Rodefer, supra note 103. 
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only to help prosecute gambling websites that operate in states that 
have explicitly outlawed online gambling.365  Therefore, these 
federal laws render Internet gambling illegal. 
c) The Federal Government Has Failed to Pass Any 
Legislation Outlawing Internet Gambling 
In addition, Casino City argues that the majority of Congress 
does not share the DOJ’s desire to “protect” the American public 
from Internet gambling.366  Casino City’s website provides a 
statement from congressional Representative Barney Frank (D-
Mass) in support of this position: 
I would have hoped that the American experience with 
alcohol in the ’20s and ’30s would have made my 
colleagues far more skeptical of new forms of prohibition 
than they have been.  I agree with you that this legislation 
violates the principle of leaving the Internet unregulated, 
and violates as well the privacy of millions of Americans.  
While I do not myself gamble, I think it is a choice that 
adults should be able to make for themselves, and I do not 
support restrictions of this sort, especially when it involves 
a very intrusive form of regulation of the Internet . . . .367 
Similarly, the numerous failed Congressional attempts to 
outlaw Internet gambling supports Casino City’s position that 
current federal law does not outlaw Internet gambling.368 
d) Internet Gambling is Legal in Other Countries that 
Access Casino City’s Websites via the Internet 
In addition, Casino City contends that because of the Internet’s 
borderless nature, an advertisement for a product or service that is 
illegal in the United States should be considered “lawful” for 
 
 365 Cf.  Rodefer, supra note 95; Rodefer, supra note 103. 
 366 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 367 Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9 (responding to a 
letter from Casino City CEO Michael Corfman). 
 368 See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (describing the attempted legislation). 
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Central Hudson purposes if it is legal anywhere in the world.369  
Because Casino City’s website can be accessed throughout the 
world, including jurisdictions in which online gambling is legal, 
Casino City asserts that the DOJ cannot restrict advertising for 
gambling websites regardless of the legality of the underlying 
activity in the United States.370  Casino City grounds this argument 
in Reno v. ACLU,371 in which the Supreme Court confronted a First 
Amendment challenge regarding the implications of pornography 
over the Internet.372  Casino City argues that under Reno, “the DOJ 
cannot assert that the advertisements placed by Casino City 
concern per se illegal conduct, unprotected by the First 
Amendment [because t]he Internet is a ‘vast platform’ from which 
publishers, advertisers and the like can address and hear from a 
‘worldwide audience . . . .’”373 
Casino City contends that its claim “is not factually dissimilar 
to the broadcasters’ claim in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,” 
in which the Supreme Court held that “the power to prohibit or to 
regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the power 
to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct.”374  Greater New 
Orleans concerned activities that were illegal in some states but 
not prohibited by federal law,375 as opposed to activities that are 
 
 369 See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 22–23, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) 
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
 370 See id. at 21–22. 
 371 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 372 See id. at 584 (striking down the Communications Decency Act’s prohibition on the 
knowing transmission of “indecent” material to anyone under the age of eighteen); 
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 18–21, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 373 Id. at 21. 
 374 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) 
(internal citations omitted).  The Supreme Court first mentioned this doctrine in the 1975 
Bigelow case. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–24 (1975).  In that decision, the 
Court emphasized that the services advertised in the newspaper were legal in New York 
at that time, and reasoned that the Virginia Legislature could not curtail the dissemination 
of information about services legal in another state over which Virginia had no regulatory 
authority. See id. 
 375 Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 176. 
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expressly legal in other countries only.376  However, Casino City 
argues that its claim is even “more compelling” than the claim in 
Greater New Orleans because it “involves substantial and new 
considerations not present in Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting,”377 including “the implications of the less ‘invasive’ 
Internet and the accessibility of the commercial speech on the 
Internet by persons located around the world where online 
sportsbooks and online casinos are not illegal.”378 
Casino City supports its position that Internet gambling is not 
“illegal” for purposes of the Central Hudson test, regardless of its 
legal status in the United States, by referring to a November 2004 
ruling by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).379  The WTO 
ruled that United States restrictions on Internet gambling violated 
free trade commitments the United States made as a member of the 
WTO, and that the United States government should drop its 
prohibitions on Americans placing bets on online casinos.380  
Online gambling operators hailed the judgment a major victory.381  
United States officials were quick to denounce the ruling,382 stating 
that their WTO commitments were clearly intended to exclude 
gambling,383 and calling the ruling “an effort to extend the values 
 
 376 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 21–22, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3) (providing that once advertisements 
for online sports books and casinos are on its portal, “the advertisements are available for 
viewing by tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the Internet, 
many of whom are located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised 
is expressly legal”). 
 377 Id. at 22. 
 378 Id. 
 379 See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 19, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Associated Press, Update 1: WTO: U.S. 
Should Drop Gambling Ban (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.forbes.com/work-
/feeds/ap/2004/11/10/ap1647030.html.  The WTO decision confirmed a preliminary 
ruling issued by the panel in March 2004. Id. 
 380 See id. 
 381 Rick Smith & Keith Furlong, Antigua v. U.S., David vs. Goliath: The U.S. Protects 
its Own, the World Trade Organization and Online Gaming, Interactive Gaming Council, 
at http://www.igcouncil.org/read_news.php?id=5 (May 13, 2004). 
 382 Id. (arguing that gambling is not included among the “services” in the trade 
agreement). 
 383 See id. 
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of other countries to the United States.”384  The Bush 
administration immediately appealed the decision.385 
The ruling supports Casino City’s argument that the United 
States’ fears about online gambling are not shared by many other 
jurisdictions that have legalized online gambling and have access 
to Casino City’s webpage.386  Indeed, some of the Internet 
gambling websites in dispute are licensed and legally based in 
Great Britain,387 and the Canadian football league recently signed a 
sponsorship deal with sports gambling websites.388  The 
sanctioning of online gambling by nations like Great Britain and 
Canada, which have similar economic, social, and security 
interests to the United States, seems to refute the Justice 
Department’s claims that online gambling is so dangerous it should 
be prohibited outright.389  Given the unique global nature of the 
Internet, Casino City contends that Internet gambling is “lawful” 
under Central Hudson regardless of its legal status in the United 
States. 
2. Advertising for Gambling Websites Does Not Constitute 
“Aiding and Abetting” Illegal Activity 
After establishing the legality of Internet gambling, Casino 
City’s next argument is that the federal government, having failed 
to explicitly criminalize Internet gambling, cannot prosecute 
American media companies that advertise these websites under the 
“aiding and abetting” statute.390  In its complaint, Casino City 
argues that the DOJ’s application of the “aiding and abetting” 
statute to it and others similarly situated—specifically with respect 
 
 384 Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.  For example, Rep. Michael 
Oxley said that “the WTO’s action has significantly reduced its status and credibility as a 
reliable arbiter of international trade disputes.” Smith & Furlong, supra note 381. 
 385 See Smith & Furlong, supra note 381. 
 386 See generally id. 
 387 See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 388 See Canadian Press, CFL to be Sponsored by Off-Shore Gambling Company, FORT 
MCMURRAY TODAY (Alta.), Oct. 13, 2004, at B2. 
 389 See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. 
 390 See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 21–22, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) 
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004); Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
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to aiding and abetting a violation of the Wire Act, Travel Act, or 
Illegal Gambling Business Act—violates the First Amendment.391 
The federal government is attempting to prosecute advertisers 
through the “aiding and abetting” statute because of the lack of any 
explicit federal anti-Internet gambling laws and the fact that only a 
small number of states have outlawed Internet gambling.392  
However, even if some forms of Internet gambling were illegal 
under federal law, the “aiding and abetting” statute requires a 
showing that the defendant willfully associated himself with a 
criminal enterprise.393  The courts will generally cut off the reach 
of a statute “if it is applied to situations absurdly remote from the 
concerns of the statute’s framers.”394  Thus far, this “remoteness” 
principle has prevented credit card companies from being 
prosecuted for aiding and abetting illegal online gambling 
enterprises.395  Concerns about the remoteness of association apply 
to advertisers as well as credit card companies.396  This argument is 
particularly strong for advertisers in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in Greater New Orleans that restrictions 
on speech require greater scrutiny than restrictions on the 
underlying conduct.397 
3. Internet Gambling Advertising Satisfies the Central 
Hudson Analysis 
To prevail in this action, Casino City will have to prove that 
online gambling is lawful activity, and that the government’s 
advertising ban violates the second, third, or fourth prong of the 
Central Hudson test, which applies when the government attempts 
 
 391 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 392 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 393 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Walters, supra note 110, at 446. 
 394 Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 395 See id. (citing Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (W.D. 
Wis. 1999). But see supra note 50 (New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer accused 
Citibank of knowingly profiting from an illegal activity, which could have resulted in 
criminal liability under New York law.  Citibank denied any wrongdoing but agreed to 
contribute $400,000 to compulsive gambler counseling services and stopped allowing its 
credit cards to be utilized for online gambling). 
 396 See generally Walters, supra note 8, at 116. 
 397 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999); 
see also supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
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to regulate speech about legal, nonmisleading activity.398  
Regarding step two, Casino City alleges in its complaint against 
the DOJ that the “United States does not have a substantial interest 
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free 
expression” resulting from the DOJ’s actions.399  The Supreme 
Court’s recent skepticism toward governmental “interests” in 
regulating gambling speech, given all of the pro-gambling statutes 
Congress has enacted in recent years, supports Casino City’s 
position on this issue.400 
Casino City further alleges that the DOJ’s threatened actions 
“would not effectively serve any purported government 
interest,”401 thereby failing to satisfy step three of the Central 
Hudson test.402  Casino City argues that in this case: 
The DOJ has no evidence of a harm and certainly no 
evidence that its restriction will alleviate the speculative 
harm to a “material degree.” . . . Banning U.S. portals from 
carrying Internet gaming advertisements does little if 
anything to remove the advertisements from the Internet as 
foreign based portals will continue to carry them unabated.  
This fact wholly undermines the DOJ’s already weak and 
speculative argument.403 
The inconsistency of the government’s position on alternate 
types of gambling—in that it simultaneously encourages state-run 
and Indian-run casinos404 and discourages Internet gambling405—
also supports Casino City’s argument that the DOJ’s actions do not 
directly advance the governmental interest. 
 
 398 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 399 Complaint at 4, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-
M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
 400 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 186–87. 
 401 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 402 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 403 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 404 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190–91. 
 405 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19–22, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
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Casino City also asserts that the government’s “application is 
not narrowly drawn to effectuate any purported government 
interest”406 and thus the DOJ fails the fourth step of the Central 
Hudson test.407  Casino City claims that “[n]o factual record has 
been developed or evidence offered” to support the DOJ’s claim of 
a “reasonable fit.”408  Furthermore, the government does not have 
extra leeway to regulate this commercial speech because it is 
related to “vice” activities.409  In 44 Liquormart and subsequent 
cases, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the government’s 
paternalistic interest in restricting advertising for “vice” 
activities.410 
Casino City argues that the DOJ’s efforts to prosecute Internet 
gambling advertisers for aiding and abetting criminal activity fail 
the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson 
analysis, and that the advertisements are thus protected by the First 
Amendment; therefore, online gambling is legal under federal law 
and satisfies the Central Hudson test.411  Furthermore, Casino City 
argues that the aiding and abetting theory is not applicable to 
online gambling advertising due to the tenuousness of the link 
between the advertisers and any unlawful activity.412  Finally, 
based on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Reno and Greater New 
Orleans, and the recent WTO decision, Casino City contends that 
it has the First Amendment right to advertise online gambling 
regardless of the legality of the underlying conduct under federal 
law.413 
Casino City and the Department of Justice both have 
compelling arguments, supported by statutory interpretation and 
 
 406 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 407 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 408 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 409 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513–14 (1996); see also 
discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 410 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 513–14; supra notes 202–214; see also, e.g., 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 589 (2001). 
 411 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 412 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 413 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.d. 
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case law.414  To determine which side should prevail, the two 
major issues to be resolved are: (1) whether or not online gambling 
is illegal under federal law, and (2) whether the DOJ’s actions 
satisfy the final three increasingly strict prongs of the Central 
Hudson analysis. 
III. UNDER THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST, THE DOJ MAY PROHIBIT 
THE ADVERTISING OF ONLINE SPORTSBOOKS BUT NOT ONLINE 
CASINOS 
An analysis of the federal case law and statutory scheme 
through the paradigm of the Casino City action indicates that the 
federal government may lawfully prohibit Casino City from 
advertising for online sportsbooks but not online casino-style 
gambling.  The DOJ is correct that the Wire Act makes Internet 
sports gambling illegal under federal law.415  Therefore, 
advertisements for sports wagering websites constitute commercial 
speech regarding an unlawful activity, which will fail step one of 
the Central Hudson test and not be protected by the First 
Amendment.416  By contrast, neither the Wire Act nor other federal 
laws prohibit casino-style Internet gambling, which means the First 
Amendment protects advertisements for this activity.417  Although 
the DOJ has a “substantial interest” in banning these 
advertisements, its actions do not satisfy steps three or four of the 
Central Hudson test because they do not directly advance a 
substantial government interest and are more extensive than 
necessary to serve the government’s interest.418  Therefore, Casino 
City should win a declaratory judgment entitling it to continue 
advertising online casinos, but prohibiting it from further 
advertising online sportsbooks.  If the federal government wants to 
prohibit casino-style Internet gambling, or impose a blanket ban on 
 
 414 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 415 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 416 See id. 
 417 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 418 See supra notes 401–410 and accompanying text. 
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its advertising, Congress “must make its intentions clear in the 
form of new legislation” outlawing the activity.419 
A. Central Hudson Step 1: Online Casino-Style Gambling Is 
“Lawful Activity” but Online Sports Betting Is Not “Lawful 
Activity” 
Online sports wagering is illegal under the Wire Act;420 
therefore, its advertisement is not protected by the First 
Amendment under step one of the Central Hudson analysis.421  
Conversely, online casino-style gambling is not explicitly 
prohibited by the Wire Act or any other federal law,422 it is not 
expressly prohibited by the majority of the States,423 and it is not 
illegal in the countries where the websites are based.424  
Accordingly, advertising for online casinos constitutes lawful 
commercial speech that warrants First Amendment protection 
under Central Hudson.425 
The first step in the Central Hudson analysis is to determine 
whether online gambling advertisements are protected by the First 
Amendment.426  Central Hudson clearly establishes that the First 
Amendment does not protect illegal or misleading commercial 
speech.427  In addition, “[c]ase law indicates that the first prong of 
Central Hudson generally has been interpreted liberally.”428 
An analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of the 
Wire Act makes clear that the statute can be applied to transactions 
over the Internet.  The plain meaning of the phrase “transmission 
 
 419 Manter, supra note 6, at 11. 
 420 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). 
 421 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 422 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952, 1955 (2000 & Supp. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 
(2000). 
 423 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 424 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.d. 
 425 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 426 See id. 
 427 See id. at 563–64. 
 428 Burke, supra note 127, at 486–87 (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 
418, 426 (1993); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–23 (1975)). 
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of a wire communication”429 is “flexible enough to allow its 
application to Internet gambling transactions”430 even though the 
Wire Act was promulgated before the Internet existed.431  This is 
because “[a]t some point in all Internet transactions, even so-called 
wireless connections that were not possible at the time the [Wire 
Act] was enacted, [phone, cable, or other] wires are still typically 
used.”432  The legislative intent of the Wire Act supports a broad 
interpretation of the phrase “transmission of a wire 
communication.”433  Congress promulgated the Wire Act to assist 
states in enforcing their gambling laws by prohibiting the use of 
wire communication facilities for gambling transmissions in 
interstate and foreign commerce.434  The same justifications are 
applicable to Internet gambling today because the States that have 
outlawed Internet gambling need federal help to pursue the crime 
due to the difficulty and expense involved.435  Thus, the Cohen 
court correctly held that the phrase “transmission of a wire 
communication” could be interpreted to outlaw gambling via the 
Internet.436 
The Wire Act does not proscribe all Internet gambling, 
however – only Internet sports gambling.437  The statute makes 
unlawful the wire transmission of bets or wagers on “any sporting 
event or contest.”438 
There are different opinions as to whether Congress intended 
the word “sporting” to modify both “event” and “contest,” or only 
to modify “event.”439  While “[a] narrow construction would seem 
 
 429 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000). 
 430 McGinty, supra note 85, at 212.  “Depending on how Internet technology develops, 
however, future Internet communications may no longer be wire communications 
covered under the Wire Act.” GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13. 
 431 McGinty, supra note 85, at 210; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 432 Id. at 212. 
 433 See id. at 213; see also Rodefer, supra note 84. 
 434 See McGinty, supra note 85, at 212–13. 
 435 See id. at 213. 
 436 See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 437 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000); see also In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 
468, 480 (E.D. La. 2001). 
 438 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). 
 439 See Rodefer, supra note 84. 
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to suggest that the phrase is limited to sports-related activities,”440 
a broad interpretation would encompass traditional casino games 
or games of chance, and include non-sports related Internet 
gambling in the Wire Act prohibitions.441  The statutory language, 
legislative history, and case law all support a narrow interpretation 
of the term “sporting event or contest” to render the Wire Act 
applicable only to online sports betting.442 
The phrase “sporting event or contest” is not defined in the 
Wire Act itself.443  However, the definitional section that applies to 
the Wire Act444 defines “gambling establishment” as “any common 
gaming or gambling establishment operated for the purpose of 
gaming or gambling, including . . . a policy game or any other 
lottery, or playing a game of chance, for money or other thing of 
value.”445  Similarly, under the Illegal Gambling Business Act,446 
“gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, 
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and 
conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling 
chances therein.”447  Congress’ use of these terms and definitions 
indicates that it was aware of the various forms of gambling but 
specifically limited the Wire Act’s application to “sporting events 
or contests.”448 
The legislative history of the Wire Act also supports a narrow 
construction of the term “sporting event or contest” in which 
“sporting” modifies both “event” and “contest.”449  First, the 
legislation was entitled “Sporting Events—Transmission of Bets, 
Wagers, and Related Information.”450  Second, the 1961 House of 
Representatives Report on Senate Bill 1656 states that the Wire 
 
 440 Id. 
 441 See id. 
 442 Id. 
 443 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). 
 444 18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2000); see also Rodefer, supra note 84. 
 445 18 U.S.C. § 1081. 
 446 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000). 
 447 Id. § 1955(b)(2). 
 448 See Rodefer, supra note 84. 
 449 See id. 
 450 Id. (citing Sporting Events—Transmission of Bets, Wagers, and Related Information 
Act, Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491, 552–53 (1961)). 
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Act was being passed in response to “modern bookmaking” and 
interchangeably utilizes the terms “sporting event or contest” and 
“sporting event.”451  Third, the 1961 Report contains a letter from 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives that refers only to wagering on sporting events 
in its discussion of the legislation.452  Thus, the legislative history 
clearly demonstrates the lawmakers’ belief that the Wire Act only 
applied to sports betting and not to games of chance. 
The holdings of the Second and Fifth Circuits in Cohen453 and 
In re MasterCard454 are both consistent with this interpretation of 
the Wire Act.  Indeed, in Cohen, Jay Cohen was convicted of 
running an Internet sports betting operation in violation of the Wire 
Act.455  In In re MasterCard, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs could not rely on the Wire Act as a predicate offense to 
their RICO charges because they had failed to allege they had 
engaged in Internet sports betting.456  The court stated: “[T]he 
Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling,”457 and 
so “any debts incurred in connection with such gambling are not 
illegal.”458  Essentially, the Second Circuit was correct that the 
Wire Act prohibits Internet sports wagering,459 and the Fifth 
Circuit was correct that the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports 
related Internet gambling.460 
The statutory text, legislative history, and case law support the 
conclusion that Internet sports wagering is illegal under the Wire 
Act but other types of Internet gambling are permissible.  Because 
online sports wagering is not “lawful activity” under United States 
law, it fails step one of the Central Hudson test and the DOJ can 
 
 451 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 
2631–33). 
 452 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 
2633–34). 
 453 United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 454 In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 455 See Cohen, 260 F.3d at 71. 
 456 See In re MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 262. 
 457 Id. at 263. 
 458 Id. 
 459 See Cohen, 260 F.3d at 76. 
 460 See In re MasterCard Int’l, 313 F.3d. at 263. 
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prohibit its advertisement.  Casino City’s argument “that the 
activity it is advertising is not ‘per se’ illegal [under Central 
Hudson] because there are places in the world where Internet 
gambling is legal, and because plaintiff cannot control the 
community where its advertisements appear due to the nature of 
the Internet,”461 is without merit.  The Wire Act renders online 
sports wagering illegal “everywhere in this country.”462  
Furthermore, Casino City “identifies no support in any 
jurisdiction . . . for a rule that would allow the world’s most 
permissive legal regimes to influence in any way the ability of this 
country to enforce its laws.”463  Although Casino City relies on 
Greater New Orleans for support, that case concerned land-based 
gambling, which was illegal in some states but not prohibited by 
federal law.464  It is a huge leap to expand the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning to argue that the United States cannot curtail the 
dissemination of information about services that are legal in other 
countries but prohibited by federal law.465  Since essentially any 
product or service can be advertised online today, such a ruling 
would severely undermine the government’s law enforcement 
power.466  Therefore, Casino City fails step one of the Central 
Hudson test with regard to advertising online sports betting. 
This logic does not apply to casino-style online gambling, 
however, because this activity is not prohibited by the Wire Act.467  
Nor is casino-style Internet gambling expressly outlawed by the 
Travel Act or Illegal Gambling Business Act.468  Both of these 
statutes require predicate violations of state or local law,469 and 
could probably be utilized to prosecute Internet gambling outfits 
that operated in states that had explicitly outlawed Internet 
 
 461 Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. 
United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (restating Casino City’s argument). 
 462 Id. 
 463 Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Casino City (No. 04-
557-B-M3). 
 464 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999). 
 465 See generally id.; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 466 See generally Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–9, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 467 See supra notes 437–466 and accompanying text. 
 468 See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
 469 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a), 1955(b)(1)(i) (2000). 
FRESE 4/4/2005  1:17 PM 
610 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:547 
gambling.  However, the lack of a federal prohibition, along with 
the fact that only a few states have outlawed Internet gambling 
thus far, indicates that Internet gambling cannot be considered 
illegal under the Travel Act or Illegal Gambling Business Act for 
the purposes of the Central Hudson test.  This is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of land-based gambling, which is 
legal in some states and illegal in others.470 
The Supreme Court has held that one state “may not, under the 
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another 
state from disseminating information about an activity that is legal 
in that [other] state.”471  The Supreme Court would not extend this 
holding to protect commercial activities that were explicitly 
outlawed under federal law, such as online sports wagering.472  
However, the lack of any specific federal prohibition of casino-
style Internet gambling, the fact that most online casinos are legal 
and licensed in their countries of origin, and the recent WTO ruling 
that United States criminalization of online betting violates global 
laws indicate that casino-style gambling is “lawful” for Central 
Hudson purposes.473  Together, these factors generate too much 
uncertainty for a court to find that non-sports Internet gambling is 
illegal under step one of the Central Hudson test. 
Because casino-style Internet gambling is not illegal under 
federal law, online casino advertisements warrant First 
Amendment protection unless the government can satisfy steps two 
through four of the Central Hudson analysis.474 
B. Central Hudson Step 2: The DOJ Has a “Substantial” Interest 
in Restricting Internet Gambling Advertising 
The federal government can satisfy step two of the Central 
Hudson analysis475 because it has a “substantial interest” in 
reducing online casino-style gambling advertising.  In this step, 
 
 470 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 187 (1999). 
 471 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824–25 (1975). 
 472 See supra notes 461–466 and accompanying text. 
 473 See supra notes 369–389 and accompanying text. 
 474 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 475 See id. 
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“the Government bears the burden of identifying a substantial 
interest and justifying the challenged restriction.”476  Casino City 
argues that “the United States does not have a substantial interest 
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free 
expression.”477  However, the DOJ does have a strong interest in 
reducing demand for online gambling operations, given that 
gambling websites can be so easily accessed by children and 
compulsive gamblers, and also due to the potential use of the 
websites for fraud and money laundering.478 
Although the Supreme Court has been increasingly skeptical of 
the government’s proffered interests in regulating commercial 
speech related to advertising for land-based gambling and other 
“vice” activities,479 thus far it has always been willing to accept the 
government’s interest in reducing commercial speech regarding 
gambling as “substantial.”480  In Greater New Orleans, the 
Supreme Court accepted the substantiality of the government’s 
interest in restricting land-based gambling advertisements in order 
to reduce the social costs associated with casino gambling and to 
assist States that restricted gambling or prohibited casino gambling 
within their borders, despite its finding that the social costs were 
largely “offset, and sometimes outweighed, by countervailing 
policy considerations, primarily in the form of economic 
benefits.”481  The Supreme Court was similarly skeptical of Rhode 
Island’s alcohol price advertising ban in 44 Liquormart, but 
nevertheless found that the state had a substantial interest in 
promoting temperance and reducing alcohol consumption.482 
The federal government’s interest in restricting advertising for 
online casinos is more compelling, and less worthy of skepticism, 
than in the context of land-based gambling because of the unique 
nature of Internet gambling.  Internet gambling implicates 
 
 476 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
 477 Complaint at 4, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-
M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004). 
 478 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 479 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502–03 (1996). 
 480 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001). 
 481 Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 185–86. 
 482 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504. 
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dangerous social consequences that are not applicable to land-
based gambling, such as the possibility of terrorist money 
laundering and consumer fraud, the inability to prevent children 
from gambling, and the inability to safeguard against compulsive 
gambling.483  These unique social ills give the government a 
substantial interest in restricting this advertising.484 
Furthermore, in contrast to the federal government’s 
contradictory policies with regard to land-based gambling, its 
position against Internet gambling has been consistent and 
uniform.485  In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court’s 
skepticism about the substantiality of the federal government’s 
interest was the result of the government’s simultaneous 
encouragement of Native American and state-run casinos and 
lotteries and discouragement of privately-operated casinos.486  This 
conflicting approach weakened the government’s argument that the 
Communications Act should be applied to private land-based 
gambling advertising.487  By contrast, the Bush administration’s 
policy, like the Clinton administration’s before it, is clearly anti-
Internet gambling, and Congress has not promulgated any 
legislation condoning Internet gambling.488  Therefore, the federal 
government has a consistent position of disfavoring Internet 
gambling, and can demonstrate that it has a substantial interest in 
reducing its demand.489 
C. Central Hudson Step 3: The DOJ’s Actions Do Not “Directly 
Advance” the Governmental Interest Asserted 
Although the federal government has a substantial interest in 
prohibiting online gambling advertising, the DOJ cannot satisfy 
step three of the Central Hudson test because thus far it has failed 
to put forth any evidence beyond speculation or conjecture linking 
 
 483 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); McGinty, supra note 85, at 206–07. 
 484 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 485 See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 486 See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190. 
 487 See id. 
 488 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 489 See generally discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
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online gambling advertising to the ills it hopes to remedy.490  The 
DOJ’s efforts to prohibit online casino-style gambling advertising 
constitute a “blanket ban” on truthful, nonmisleading commercial 
speech about lawful conduct.491  Therefore, the government’s 
action “strikes at the heart of the First Amendment”492 and must be 
reviewed with “special care.”493  This means that under step three, 
the DOJ must demonstrate that the ban will significantly advance 
the government’s interest.494 
Step three also requires that the government’s abridgement of 
commercial speech “directly advance” its asserted interest.  As 
Edenfield instructs, the DOJ must demonstrate that the challenged 
advertising restrictions advance its interest “in a direct and material 
way.”495  This burden cannot be “satisfied by mere speculation or 
conjecture,”496 nor by “anecdotal evidence and educated 
guesses.”497  Indeed, in 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island failed to 
establish a “reasonable fit” between its abridgement of speech and 
its temperance goal because it did not provide any evidence of a 
connection between its price advertising ban and a significant 
change in alcohol consumption.498  Conversely, in Lorillard 
Tobacco, the Massachusetts Attorney General satisfied step three 
because the state’s tobacco advertising ban was based on studies 
that demonstrated a link between advertising and demand for 
cigarettes.499  Step three also requires that commercial speech 
restrictions be rational and not be contradictory.500  Thus, in Rubin, 
the Court struck down a labeling restriction because of the “overall 
 
 490 See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 25, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) 
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004); Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); see also 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 574 
(1980); cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). 
 491 Cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574. 
 492 Id. 
 493 Id. at 566 n.9. 
 494 Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996). 
 495 Cf. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (1993). 
 496 Id. at 770. 
 497 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995). 
 498 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506–07. 
 499 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 560–61 (2001). 
 500 See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488. 
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irrationality” of the regulatory scheme, which prohibited the 
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels but not in 
advertising.501 
The DOJ cannot satisfy these high standards in the present 
case.  It argues that its advertising ban “directly advances” the goal 
of the “aiding and abetting” statute because punishing and 
deterring advertising for online gambling operations reduces the 
ability of such operations to solicit customers.502  However, as 
Casino City correctly points out, the DOJ’s assertions are “legally 
insufficient” because the DOJ provides “no evidence of a harm and 
certainly no evidence that its restriction will alleviate the 
speculative harm to a ‘material degree.’”503 
The DOJ’s actions clearly do not “directly advance” its interest 
in protecting the public from the social problems associated with 
online gambling, such as compulsive and underage gambling.504  
The Supreme Court has long been skeptical of governmental 
efforts to regulate commercial speech for the public’s own good.505  
Indeed, 44 Liquormart and subsequent cases established that states 
do “not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, 
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes.”506  In its 
motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the DOJ merely asserts 
that reducing advertising will reduce demand.507  The DOJ does 
not support its hypothesis with any evidence as to how prosecuting 
American advertisers will reduce the social problems associated 
with Internet gambling, considering that foreign advertisers could 
continue to market Internet gambling to Americans outside the 
 
 501 Id. 
 502 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 22, Casino 
City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 
2004). 
 503 Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 25, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 504 See generally id. 
 505 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 760–73 (1976) (holding that a consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
information is protected by the First Amendment because such information is necessary 
for well-informed private economic decisions). 
 506 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996). 
 507 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22, Casino 
City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
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DOJ’s jurisdictional reach.508  Given the total lack of evidence 
provided, the DOJ’s paternalistic interest in preventing the social 
ills it associates with Internet gambling cannot justify its blanket 
advertising ban under current First Amendment doctrine.509 
Furthermore, the DOJ’s actions do not “directly advance” its 
interest in protecting Americans from money laundering and 
consumer fraud.510  Although the federal government has a 
substantial interest in protecting the safety and commercial 
interests of Americans that goes beyond paternalism, the DOJ’s 
argument that terrorists and organized crime could use gambling 
websites to launder money fails step three due to a lack of any 
demonstrable evidence.511  The Internet gambling prohibition was 
dropped from the final version of the Patriot Act due to the lack of 
substantial evidence of a connection between Internet gambling 
and terrorism.512  Furthermore, the 2002 GAO Report to Congress 
on Internet gambling found that while law enforcement officials 
believed that money laundering could potentially be conducted on 
gambling websites, no cases of this had ever been prosecuted.513  
Additionally, “[r]epresentatives of the credit card and gambling 
industries believed that online gambling was not necessarily more 
susceptible to money laundering than any other type of on-line 
transaction.”514  The mixed views regarding online gambling’s 
vulnerability to money laundering, along with the DOJ’s failure to 
provide any evidence in support of its contention, destroy its step 
three argument. 
Likewise, although the DOJ has a substantial interest in 
preventing gambling websites from defrauding American 
 
 508 See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 509 Cf. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510. 
 510 See generally Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 511 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response 
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 25, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); cf. Edenfield v. 
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). 
 512 Manter, supra note 6, at 5. 
 513 See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 35. 
 514 Id.  While the views of the gambling industry here are not persuasive, the view of the 
credit card companies is revealing. 
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gamblers, it has not yet offered any evidence that fraud is actually 
occurring on these offshore websites.515  Nor has the DOJ 
attempted to justify its advertising crackdown on consumer 
protection grounds.516  If the fairness of online gambling was really 
the federal government’s concern, it would be better alleviated by 
sanctioning domestic Internet gambling operations that could be 
audited and monitored.517 
The Supreme Court has established a First Amendment 
doctrine that favors free consumer discourse and sets a high 
threshold for the government to justify restrictions on commercial 
speech.518  Because the DOJ has not put forth any evidence beyond 
“speculation or conjecture” linking online gambling advertising to 
the ills it hopes to remedy, its enforcement actions do not “directly 
advance” its proffered interests and must fail step three of the 
Central Hudson test.519 
D. Central Hudson Step 4: The DOJ’s Restrictions Are “More 
Extensive than Necessary” to Serve the Governmental Interest 
The DOJ’s prosecution of online gambling advertisers also 
fails the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis because its 
actions are “more extensive than necessary” to achieve its 
objective.520  It is well established that step four requires a 
“reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends.”521  Here, the federal 
government’s actions have not been “narrowly drawn to effectuate 
any purported government interest.”522  Therefore, there is no 
reasonable fit between the government’s goal of reducing the 
 
 515 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17–22, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 516 See id. 
 517 See Lang, supra note 26, at 548–49. 
 518 See id. 
 519 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 520 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 521 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001) (citing Fla. Bar v. Went 
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995)). 
 522 Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
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demand for online gambling and its method of advancing this goal 
through advertising restrictions.523 
To establish a reasonable fit, the government “is not required to 
employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must 
demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the 
asserted interest.”524  The “challenged regulation should indicate 
that its proponent carefully calculated the costs and benefits 
associated with the burden on speech imposed by its 
prohibition.”525  In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court 
rejected the government’s application of the Communications Act 
against private, land-based casinos, holding that “[t]here surely are 
practical and nonspeech-related forms of regulation . . . that could 
more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costs of 
casino gambling.”526  Although Internet gambling is 
distinguishable from land-based gambling because most gambling 
websites operate outside the jurisdiction of the United States 
(which limits the alternative means of regulation such as audits and 
other oversight), the DOJ does not appear to have even considered 
any alternative means of reducing demand for online gambling 
before threatening online gambling advertisers.527 
Furthermore, the federal government’s actions are not narrowly 
tailored because the DOJ has targeted all types of online gambling 
advertising via all mediums, in all states.528  First, the DOJ has not 
discriminated between online sportsbooks and casinos.529  If it had 
focused on prosecuting Internet sports gambling advertising, it 
probably would have been within its authority under the Wire 
Act.530  However, the subpoenas issued by the St. Louis U.S. 
 
 523 Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556. 
 524 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 525 Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 526 Id. at 192. 
 527 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). 
 528 Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63, 585 (finding an advertising ban to be “loosely 
tailored” due to its geographic scope and the breadth of advertisements it affected). 
 529 See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 530 See supra notes 420–460 and accompanying text. 
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Attorney General’s office demanded information about both forms 
of gambling, and the money the DOJ seized from Discovery 
Networks was not strictly from sports wagering websites.531  The 
federal government’s actions are “more extensive than necessary” 
because they made no effort to distinguish between the types of 
gambling activity being advertised. 
In addition, the DOJ’s actions are fatally overbroad because it 
has not distinguished between advertising mediums.532  The DOJ 
sent its June 2003 warning letters to trade groups representing 
major broadcasters and publishers.533  The St. Louis U.S. Attorney 
General’s office subpoenaed media outlets, Internet portals, public 
relations firms, and other companies.534  This indicates the DOJ did 
not attempt to sculpt its actions into the existing federal statutes 
that regulate gambling advertising via television, radio, and direct 
mail.535  For example, it could have potentially utilized the 
Communications Act to bar gambling websites from advertising 
via the radio and television in states that had expressly outlawed 
online gambling.536  Although the Communications Act has been 
limited by recent First Amendment cases in the context of land-
based gambling,537 it could probably sustain a governmental 
attempt to prohibit the broadcast of online gambling 
advertisements because there are no conflicting federal statutes 
governing Internet gambling.  Accordingly, the federal government 
could not be accused of inconsistent or contradictory legislation, as 
it was in Greater New Orleans.538  The DOJ’s actions may not 
have been considered overbroad if it had only targeted Internet 
 
 531 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 532 See generally supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 533 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 534 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 535 Cf. Walters, supra note 8, at 115–16 (describing federal regulatory options available 
depending on the medium chosen to market online gambling). 
 536 See discussion supra Part I.A.4.a. 
 537 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 
(1999). 
 538 See id. (holding that that the application of the Communications Act to the broadcast 
of gambling advertisements by radio or television stations located in a state where such 
gambling was legal violated the First Amendment).  However, the Communications Act 
does not cover the Internet or cable television because they are not “broadcast” for the 
purposes of the Act. Walters, supra note 8, at 115–16. 
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gambling advertising via direct mail.  Since the Direct Mail statute 
prohibits the use of the mail to advertise virtually all forms of 
gambling,539 this statute would prohibit the use of the mail to 
promote online casinos.540 
The DOJ overreached by targeting all media outlets—even 
companies like Casino City that advertise primarily over the 
Internet—in its campaign against online gambling.  The inclusion 
of Internet advertisers is especially problematic.541  In addition to 
the absence of a law similar to the Communications Act to restrict 
Internet gambling advertising, the Internet is distinguishable from 
television, radio, and direct mail because websites are generally 
not targeted to a specific jurisdiction, and can be accessed by users 
worldwide.542  “Since Internet advertising is contemporaneously 
available everywhere on the planet, and not ‘broadcast’ in the 
traditional sense, an analysis based on the location of the 
transmission or recipient may be logically flawed.”543  A blanket 
ban on Internet gambling advertisements that are distributed via 
the Internet is “more extensive than necessary” because it restricts 
even advertisements targeted at foreign jurisdictions in which 
online gambling is lawful.  This is pertinent within the United 
States as well, since casino-style Internet gambling is not 
prohibited by federal law, and not all states have outlawed Internet 
gambling.544  This result may have been different if the 
government had, for example, required Casino City to filter its 
advertisements by jurisdiction, but the DOJ’s attempt to prohibit 
the advertisements outright was “more extensive than 
necessary.”545 
 
 539 See supra notes 131, 134 and accompanying text. 
 540 See discussion supra Part I.A.4.b. 
 541 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 542 See Walters, supra note 8, at 115; supra notes 369–389 and accompanying text. 
 543 Walters, supra note 8, at 115. 
 544 See generally id. at 113–15. 
 545 See id. at 121 (“The inability to effectively geographically limit the target audience 
for online gambling advertising may also impair the government’s ability to 
constitutionally restrict advertising about online gaming services to areas where it is 
considered a legal activity.”); cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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In addition to the mediums of communication targeted by the 
DOJ, its actions are also overbroad because it has not 
discriminated between states that have outlawed Internet gambling 
and those that have not.546  If the DOJ had focused on helping 
states that had outlawed Internet gambling, it probably could have 
utilized the Communications Act and the direct mail statute to 
prohibit the broadcast or direct mail advertising of online casinos 
in those states.547  However, the DOJ approached this from the 
flawed perspective that all Internet gambling was illegal under 
federal law.548  As a result, the DOJ’s actions are “more extensive 
than necessary.” 
Finally, in a general sense, Casino City’s case for advertising 
online casinos is supported by the Supreme Court’s statement in 
Greater New Orleans that “the power to prohibit or to regulate 
particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to 
prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct.  It is well settled 
that the First Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of 
governmental restrictions on speech than of its regulation of 
commerce alone.”549  This declaration demonstrates the Supreme 
Court’s increasing skepticism of commercial speech restrictions, 
and the strict degree of scrutiny with which the Court will evaluate 
step four as well as the other steps of the Central Hudson test.550  
Therefore, while the Supreme Court would likely uphold a 
commercial speech restriction if the underlying product or service 
was expressly illegal under federal law, it would be much more 
skeptical of barring commercial speech if the underlying conduct 
was not illegal nationwide.551 
Because the DOJ threatened to prosecute all advertisers of 
Internet gambling services instead of limiting its efforts to the 
types of online gambling and mediums of communication it could 
 
 546 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 547 See discussion supra Parts I.A.4.a–b. 
 548 See discussion supra Parts I.A.1, II.A.1. 
 549 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 550 Cf. id. 
 551 Cf. id. 
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lawfully regulate, its application was “more extensive than 
necessary” and will fail step four of the Central Hudson test.552 
CONCLUSION 
Internet gambling advertising raises unique and controversial 
First Amendment issues.  Casino City’s declaratory judgment 
action is complicated by the fact that all of the Supreme Court’s 
past gambling advertising decisions have involved the use of 
traditional media, as opposed to the Internet.  Thus far, courts have 
neither resolved the legality of Internet gambling itself, nor 
addressed the effect of the licensure of foreign online casinos.  
Nevertheless, an analysis of the First Amendment commercial 
speech doctrine and the existing federal gambling statutes reveals 
that Casino City should prevail in its claim that it has a First 
Amendment right to advertise online casinos, but fail in its attempt 
to advertise online sports wagering. 
Advertising Internet sports gambling violates the first prong of 
the Central Hudson test because the correct interpretation of the 
Wire Act renders online sports betting illegal under federal law.  
Casino City’s assertion that this activity is not “per se” illegal 
because there are places in the world where such gambling is legal 
is without merit.  As such, advertisements for online sportsbooks 
are not protected by the First Amendment. 
In contrast, casino-style Internet gambling falls within the 
protection of the First Amendment.  These advertisements cannot 
be considered unlawful because online casinos are not currently 
illegal under the Wire Act or any other federal statute.  Although 
the DOJ has a substantial interest in regulating online casinos due 
to the risk of fraud, addiction, and terrorist money laundering, the 
DOJ’s recent prosecutorial efforts have not satisfied steps three or 
four of the Central Hudson test.  The DOJ has offered no proof 
beyond “mere speculation or conjecture” that its broad 
enforcement actions against American media companies directly 
advance its proffered interest.  In addition, the DOJ’s efforts are 
 
 552 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
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“more extensive than necessary” because they target all types of 
Internet gambling, mediums of advertising, and states, instead of 
focusing on areas in which Internet gambling is explicitly 
outlawed, or mediums subject to federal gambling broadcast laws. 
If the threats to American interests posed by Internet gambling 
are as serious as the federal government fears, Congress should 
persist in its efforts to give the DOJ the tools it needs to prevent 
offshore Internet casinos from reaching the American public.  
However, until new legislation is passed, Casino City will be 
entitled to advertise for Internet casinos, and the DOJ will be 
limited by the First Amendment to restricting advertising to only 
online sports wagering. 
 
